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Abstract 
In this paper we have examined 174 lock-up agreements in 142 unique firms. A 
lock-up refers to the prespecified time, usually 180 days, following an IPO, where 
pre-IPO shareholders enter into an agreement with the underwriter not to sell, or 
contract to sell any of their shares. We find the Oslo Stock Exchange to be 
efficient, as there are no significant price reactions around the lock-up expiry, and 
therefore we find support for the efficient market hypothesis. We also found a 
permanent increase in trading volume of 85 percent. Further, we found some 
support for the commitment hypothesis as a potential explanation for the existence 
of lock-ups. On the other hand, we found no support for the signaling and 
additional underwriter compensation hypothesis.  
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1 Introduction 
Market efficiency is a widely and thoroughly studied hypothesis. In this context, 
the study of lock-ups is particularly interesting, as it enables a different approach 
to test market efficiency and downward sloping demand curves. A lock-up 
agreement refers to a prespecified time period following an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO), where insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders are not allowed to sell their 
shares. The unique feature with lock-up agreements is that the terms and length is 
included in the IPO prospectuses, and therefore making the lock-up expiry a 
completely observable event. Further, the study of lock-ups is interesting as there 
exists several possible, but no commonly agreed upon, explanation for the 
existence of lock-up agreements.  
 
The main finding in our paper is that we find the Oslo Stock Exchange to be 
efficient, and therefore we find support for the Efficient Market Hypothesis, as 
there are no significant price reactions around the lock-up expiry. Consequently, 
there are no arbitrage opportunities. In addition, we found a permanent increase in 
trading volume of 85 percent. Further, contrary to the findings in the US, we find 
a positive relationship between abnormal return and abnormal trading volume, 
and thus we find some evidence against the theory of downward sloping demand 
curves. 
  
Similar studies in the US, among others Brav and Gompers (2000), Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) and Field and Hanka (2001), have found a consistent and 
significant negative abnormal return around the lock-up expiry date. In contrast, 
Espenlaub et al. (2001) and Goergen, Renneboog and Khursted (2006) found no 
significant price reaction in UK, Germany and France. In this context, our 
contribution is unique, since there has, to our knowledge, been committed little to 
none effort into research of the effect of lock-ups at the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
There are several possible explanations why our results do not correspond to the 
results found in the US. First, the number of observations in our sample is 
significantly smaller. Second, the sample we study is from a different and more 
recent time, i.e. 1993 to 2008. Third, Norwegian firms lock-up, on average, a 
smaller fraction of their shares than American firms.  Lastly, there may have been 
early releases of the locked-up shares that we were unable to observe. Even 
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though the empirical evidence from Germany and France seem to correspond with 
our findings, it is worth noting that lock-ups are compulsorily in Germany and 
France, while in Norway (and UK and US) they are not.  
 
Testing three potential explanations for the existence of lock-ups, we find some 
support for the explanation that lock-ups serve as a commitment device to reduce 
moral hazard. Through our study of the determinants of lock-up length, we find 
that firms associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry tend to lock-
up their shares for a longer period of time. We find no support for the 
explanations that lock-ups serves as a signal of firm quality or as a mechanism for 
underwriters to extract additional compensation. 
 
We found that the typical Norwegian lock-up agreement consists of 
approximately 40 percent of the outstanding shares and lasts for 180 days. We 
have further found that lock-up length is shorter and the fraction of shares locked-
up is higher for firms where information asymmetry and adverse selection 
problem is less severe. The reason for this could be that firms associated with a 
higher degree of information asymmetry tend to sell a higher fraction of their 
shares in the IPO (e.g. they are on average smaller) and consequently have fewer 
shares remaining to lock-up. Therefore, they must accept longer lock-up periods. 
In addition, we have found that the percentage locked-up is negatively related to 
the lock-up length. Thus, a firm can either commit by locking-up more shares or 
by accepting a longer lock-up period.  
 
In our thesis we will first present key findings from existing literature and 
previous studies. We will then use the key findings as motivation to develop 
hypotheses. We will then present the data and descriptive statistics, before we go 
through the methodology. Lastly, we will present the empirical evidence of our 
findings, as well as an interpretation of the results.  
 
2 Literature Review 
In this section we will present and review the most significant literature available 
on lock-up effects of IPOs and their empirical findings, as well as the most 
relevant literature on market efficiency and downward sloping demand curves for 
stocks. 
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Several articles, such as Brav and Gompers (2000), Ofek and Richardson (2000) 
and Field and Hanka (2001), emphasizes that the length of lock-ups are publicly 
available, thus, if markets perfectly anticipated the release there should be no 
abnormal price reaction at the time of the expiration, as the information should 
already be fully reflected in the price. 
 
Brav and Gompers (2000) represent one of the pioneer explorers in the research of 
lock-up agreements. They explore the motivation for the lock-ups by examining 
the structure and how it affects underpricing at the time of the IPO. Further, they 
explore the price reaction and trading activity at the time of the lock-up 
expiration. Their paper finds support for the theory that lock-ups serve as 
commitment mechanisms at the time of the IPO, to credibly convey its quality, 
since IPOs are potentially subject to adverse selection problems (Meyers and 
Majluf 1984). Further, they find that IPO underpricing is higher for firms with 
longer lock-up period and firms that lock up a larger fraction of their shares. They 
find an average abnormal return of -1.2% at the time of lock-up expiry, and that 
the negative abnormal return is greater for firms that lock up a greater fraction of 
their shares, firms with high market value of equity, firms with a low book-to-
market ratio and for firms that are backed by venture capitalists. They argue that 
the stock price drop challenges the framework of rational expectations, and that it 
is potentially consistent with downward sloping demand curves for stocks and/or 
investors' incorrect prior beliefs.  
 
Brav and Gompers (2003) extend their previous work, and develop three different 
hypotheses regarding reasons for the existence of lock-up agreements. They 
explore whether lock-ups serve the purpose of being a signaling mechanism for 
firm quality, a commitment device to alleviate problems of moral hazard or a 
mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing 
firms. More specifically, when they focus on the commitment hypothesis, they 
also test for the cross-sectional differences in abnormal return. While they are able 
to find support for the commitment hypothesis, they find little support for the 
signaling hypothesis. To support their commitment hypothesis, they find that 
firms who perform an SEO between the IPO and the lock-up expiry, as well as 
sell secondary shares in the offering, are associated with less information 
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asymmetry and therefore experience a smaller price drop. In addition, firms 
associated with low information asymmetry have, in average, shorter lock-up 
periods. The rejection of the signaling hypothesis is considerably challenged by 
Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005), who argue that the dismissal of the 
signaling theory is at best premature. They extend Brav and Gompers’s (2003) 
work along several dimensions. First, they develop the signaling hypothesis into a 
formal model, and argue that that it is costly to send a false signal, as the insiders 
must spend money on negative NPV projects in order to keep up appearances. 
Further, the insiders are facing considerable risk, as the lock-up period prevents 
them from selling their shares, and therefore the true value may just as well be 
revealed prior to lock-up expiry. In other words, as formulated by Brau, Lambson 
and McQueen (2005:519): “The lockup forces insiders to not only put their money 
where their mouth is but to keep them there as well”. Second, they argue that the 
support Brav and Gompers (2003) find for the commitment hypothesis also can be 
interpreted as support for the signaling hypothesis. Having provided support for 
the signaling hypothesis, they conclude that the signaling theory continues to 
possess both theoretical and empirical merit. 
 
In their paper, Ofek and Richardson (2000) investigate excess trading volume and 
price patterns at the expiration of lock-up periods, and test whether they find any 
evidence for market efficiency and/or downward sloping demand curves. Through 
their research, they document a stock price decline of 1-3 percent at expiry, while 
trading volume increases with about 40 percent. They conclude that the decline in 
stock prices provide new anomalous evidence against market efficiency. They 
explore several possible explanations, such as bid-ask bounce, liquidity effects 
and biased expectations of supply shocks. However, they find little support for 
these explanations. Further, they found some support for downward sloping 
demand curves. In addition, they also attempt to empirically explain the cross-
sectional differences in abnormal return between different firms. They find that 
certain variables, such as stock price volatility, are clearly associated with larger 
stock price drops at lock-up expiration. Even though they find a significant drop 
in stock prices at expiry, they conclude that due to capital gain taxes, bid-ask 
spread and transaction costs there are no arbitrage opportunities.  
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Similar results are reached by Field and Hanka (2001), who reports a permanent 
40 percent increase in average trading volume and a statistically prominent three-
day abnormal return of -1.5 percent.  They find that the abnormal return and 
excess volume are larger when the firm is financed by venture capitalists. They 
also find that venture capitalists sell more aggressively than insiders and other 
pre-IPO shareholders. In addition, they find that companies with a positive run up, 
i.e. the stock price has risen since the time of the IPO, experience a higher 
negative abnormal return at the lock-up expiry. Further, when examining the 
microstructure effects, they find a permanent, parallel decline in the bid and ask 
spread, and therefore argue that the abnormal return is not caused by a change in 
the proportion of trades at the bid price, temporary price pressure or increased 
transaction costs. They conclude that the negative abnormal returns may be partly, 
but not completely, caused by downward sloping demand curves or investor’s 
incorrect prior beliefs, and that the predictable price drop at expiry challenges the 
efficient market hypothesis. Like Ofek and Richardson (2000), they find that there 
are no arbitrage opportunities, as investors must trade at bid and ask prices.  
 
The findings of Field and Hanka are supported by Bradley et al. (2001), which 
find that firms backed by venture capitalists are associated with significant 
negative abnormal returns at lock-up expirations. Further, they document that 
within the group of venture capital backed firms the largest losses occur for "high-
tech" firms, firms with highest stock price increases since the IPO, the largest 
relative trading volume around lock-up expiration, and firms using the highest 
quality underwriters. The intuition behind the latter is that venture capitalists 
typically bring several firms to the market, and thus potentially have a closer 
relationship with the higher quality underwriters, giving them increased 
possibilities to negotiate shorter lock-up agreements.     
 
However, studies of lock-up expiry outside the US do not seem to coincide with 
the results of the studies conducted in the US. Espenlaub et al. (2001) find no 
statistically significant abnormal return at the expiry of lock-up agreements in the 
UK market. Although, not statistically significant, their results are consistently 
showing negative abnormal return. However, looking at the sample size used in 
the UK, it is evident that the sample size is relatively small, consisting of only 54 
observations, whereas in US, the sample size is consistently larger than thousand 
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observations. Therefore, one potential explanation for the lack of statistically 
significant results is the small sample size. Further, Goergen, Renneboog and 
Khursted (2006) make similar conclusions regarding the French and the German 
markets, where they find no statistically significant abnormal returns. It is, 
however, worth noting that lock-up agreements in Germany and France are 
compulsory1, while this is not the case in Norway, UK and the US, and could 
therefore potentially explain the lack of significant results, since firms with 
voluntary lock-ups can enter the lock-up agreements to e.g. signal their quality or 
commitment. In contrast, insiders in French firms are required to lock-up 100 
percent of their shares for a minimum of 6 months, and it would therefore, at best, 
be difficult to infer any signals about the firm from the lock-up agreement.   
 
In the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), Fama (1970) suggests that stock prices 
fully reflect all available information on a particular stock and/or market. Thus, 
investors cannot take advantage in predicting stock returns because no one has 
access to information not already available to everyone else. In this context, the 
study of lock-ups is particularly interesting because lock-up expiration is a 
completely observable event and should, according to Fama, already be fully 
reflected in the stock price.  
 
Scholes (1972) represents one of the early works, suggesting that demand curves 
for stocks are downward sloping, thus challenging theories based on the no 
arbitrage condition. More specifically, if demand curves for stocks are downward 
sloping, this implies that firms issuing shares are not only price takers, but they 
are also able to influence share price by regulating the amount of shares 
outstanding. This is contradicting the theories of Modigliani and Miller (1958), 
which implies that the supply of shares has no impact on the stock price, and firms 
issuing shares are, thus, price takers. Shleifer (1986) provides empirical support 
for downward sloping demand curves, as he find an immediate positive abnormal 
return for stocks at the announcement day of inclusion to the S&P 500 index, 
because investors know that there will be increased demand for the stock, e.g. by 
                                                 
1 The German market imposes a minimum lock-up of 6 months on all the pre-IPO shareholder’s 
shares retained immediately after the floatation. The French market requires insiders to be locked-
up with 100% of the shares for 6 months or 80% of the shares for 1 year. 
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passive mutual index funds. This is further supported by Levin and Wright (2006), 
who are also able to provide empirical support for downward sloping demand 
curves for stocks, and further argue that downward sloping demand curves for 
stocks are inconsistent with the traditional view of market efficiency, that stock 
prices are determined only by expectations of future cash flows and the discount 
rate. However, other studies, such as Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Holthausen, 
Leftwich and Mayers (1990) and Keim and Madhavan (1996), are only able to 
provide ambiguous empirical evidence for the existence of downward sloping 
demand curves for stocks.  
 
As the length of the lock-up period is clearly stated in the IPO prospectus, making 
the event completely observable, investors should, according to EMH, on average 
correctly predict the stock price at expiry. The study of lock-up expiration can 
therefore potentially provide useful information regarding the hypotheses of 
downward sloping demand curves and market efficiency. A significant change in 
stock price at lock-up expiration would imply anomalous evidences against the 
efficient market hypothesis. Further, since additional stocks are released for 
trading in the market at lock-up expiry, a significant price drop would provide 
support for the theory of downward sloping demand curves for stocks.  
 
In the literature review we have presented and reviewed the relevant existing 
literature. Several papers, such as Brav and Gompers (2000), Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) and Field and Hanka (2001), have explored the lock-up expiry 
effect in the US market, where the prevailing findings are negative abnormal 
return and positive excess volume at expiry. In contrast, Espenlaub et al. (2001) 
and Goergen, Renneboog and Khursted (2006) did not find any statistically 
significant abnormal returns for UK, France and Germany markets. Several 
reasons for the existence of lock-up agreements have been explored, where 
commitment hypothesis and signaling hypothesis are the most prominent theories 
proposed. Brav and Gompers (2003) find support for the commitment hypothesis, 
while Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005) find support the signaling hypothesis. 
Further, since the lock-up expiration is a completely observable event, it can be 
used to test the efficient market hypothesis and downward sloping demand curves 
for stocks. 
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Having reviewed the most interesting existing literature, we continue with 
developing hypotheses.  
3 Hypotheses 
During the paper we are going to go through hypotheses intended to explore 
market efficiency, downward sloping demand curves and price pressure. In 
addition, we will explore possible explanations for the existence of lock-up 
agreements, namely signaling quality, commitment device or mechanism for 
underwriters to extract additional compensation.  
3.1 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
The first hypothesis is based on the traditional view of efficiency in the stock 
market. Investors form rational expectations, and since all information about the 
terms and length of the lock-up is fully available, it should be embedded in the 
stock price at the first day of IPO trading and prior to lock-up expiry. Thus 
investors will not systematically fail in their pricing of the stock, and there should 
be no significant price reaction at lock-up expiration. Moreover, as a consequence 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms issuing shares are price takers and the 
supply of shares has no impact on the stock price.  
 
We therefore formulate the following prediction based on the efficient market 
hypothesis: 
 
There will, on average, be zero abnormal return in the time around the lock-up 
expiration. 
3.2 Downward Sloping Demand Curves for Stocks 
The competing hypothesis is inspired by the research and empirical findings of 
Ofek and Richardson (2000), Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav and Gompers 
(2000 and 2003), which document a statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns on the time around lock-up expiration. The theory of downward sloping 
demand curves for stocks suggests and supports a negative abnormal return. At 
the event of lock-up expiration a significant number of shares are suddenly 
released to the market, causing a positive shift in the supply curve of stocks. With 
downward sloping demand curves this implies a drop in the stock price. However, 
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we note that the theory of downward sloping demand curves is not directly 
contrasting market efficiency, as investors can still correctly predict the positive 
shift in the supply curve at expiry. Therefore the information should already be 
embedded in the stock price at the time of the IPO. For this reason, the theory of 
downward sloping demand curves must be supported by either investor’s incorrect 
prior beliefs or costly arbitrage.  
 
From this we form the following prediction based on the theory of downward 
sloping demand curve: 
 
There will, on average, be negative abnormal returns in the time around the lock-
up expiration. 
3.3 Commitment Hypothesis 
As in Brav and Gompers (2003), the commitment hypothesis is intended as a 
potential explanation regarding the existence of lock-ups. The hypothesis implies 
that lock-up agreements serve as a commitment device to reduce moral hazard 
problems. While firm quality is observable ex ante, there is asymmetric 
information regarding the actions of the manager subsequent to the IPO. In order 
to induce insiders to act in the best interest of the shareholders, they are obliged 
not to sell their shares for a prespecified period of time. The first prediction of the 
commitment hypothesis is related to abnormal returns at lock-up expiration, and is 
rooted in the idea that firms which are less informationally transparent will 
experience higher price reactions at lock-up expiration. Such firms have higher 
information asymmetry and are more subject to moral hazard. With these firms, it 
might be more difficult to predict how many shares hitting the market at lock-up 
expiration, and insiders can take advantage of this. If this is not accounted for by 
investors, they may be consistently surprised by how many shares hitting the 
market by such firms. Thus, the first prediction is formulated as follows: 
 
Firms associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry will experience 
larger negative abnormal returns around lock-up expiration. 
 
The second prediction (Brav and Gompers 2003) of the commitment hypothesis is 
related to the lock-up length. The idea is that firms with higher information 
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asymmetry have greater potential to take advantage of outside investors, and will 
thus need to commit with a longer lock-up period. The prediction is formulated as 
follows: 
 
Firms associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry will lock-up 
their shares for a longer period of time. 
 
We may however find that if the lock-up length is correctly set, information 
asymmetry may be dealt with in such a way that the first prediction is no longer 
valid. We will account for this effect when we test the first prediction. 
3.4 Signaling Hypothesis  
The motivation for the signaling hypothesis is that firms might want to signal their 
quality, e.g. signal that they are high quality firms, in order to extract a higher IPO 
offering price, or to achieve a better price in a subsequent SEO. Brav and 
Gompers (2003) argue that if high-quality firms are able to separate themselves 
from low-quality firms, we should observe a positive price revision, defined by 
the difference between the actual offering price and the midpoint of the initial 
offering range, for firms that lock-up their shares for a longer period. Based on the 
argument that firms can signal quality by locking up their shares for a longer 
period, we thus formulate the first prediction of the signaling hypothesis as 
follows: 
 
High-quality firms will, on average, lock-up their shares for a longer period.  
 
Brav and Gompers (2003), further argue that an alternative motivation for firms to 
signal quality, by setting a long lock-up length, is to achieve a higher price in 
subsequent SEO. We would therefore expect to find that firms with a long lock-up 
length should have a higher probability of having a subsequent SEO. We therefore 
formulate the second prediction of the signaling hypothesis as follows: 
 
 Firms with a long lock-up length will, on average, perform more SEO than firms 
with a short lock-up length.  
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3.5 Additional Underwriter Compensation Hypothesis 
The third hypothesis regarding the existence of lock-ups is that underwriters use 
lock-ups to extract additional compensation from firms going public (Brav and 
Gompers 2003). The idea is that, during the lock-up period, insiders are only 
allowed to sell if the shares are released by the underwriter. In case of release, 
underwriters would then allow block trades through the lead underwriter or 
potentially perform an SEO. In either case, the underwriter would be able to 
extract additional fees. In our research, we test this hypothesis very briefly, based 
on the assumption that high quality underwriters are able to extract more 
compensation due to their greater prestige. Thus, we formulate the following 
prediction: 
 
Lock-ups are longer for firms going public with high quality underwriters. 
 
Having formulated our hypotheses, we will now present the data, the selection 
process and the descriptive statistics. 
 
4 Data Description 
In the period between 2003 and 2008, there has been 428 IPOs (including 
spinoffs, private placements etc.) on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Examining the IPO 
prospectuses, provided by the Department of Finance at BI Norwegian Business 
School, we found 205 lock-up agreements in 167 unique companies. We excluded 
lock-up agreements where the companies were either delisted prior to lock-up 
expiry, the length of the lock-up were unspecified, or there were regulatory issues 
related to the release (e.g. the lock-up is contingent on stock price development), 
making the final sample 174 lock-up agreements in 142 unique companies. The 
final sample size is slightly larger than we anticipated in our preliminary report, 
mainly due to the fact that some companies use varying lock-up lengths for 
different shareholder groups. The sample size is, not surprisingly, much smaller 
than the sample size used for similar studies in e.g. the US. However, we believe 
that the sample size is still sufficiently large to provide reliable results. A 
summary of the sample selection is presented in table 1.  
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Sample selection N (Unique) N (Lock-ups) 
Initial Sample (1993 – 2008)
 
428 - 
Exclusion no lock-up agreement 180 - 
Exclusion missing prospectus 81 - 
Total number of lock-ups 167 205 
Delisted prior to expiry 9 10 
Lock-up length unspecified 9 11 
Regulatory issues related to release 5 8 
Other reasons 2 2 
Final Sample 142 174 
Table 1: Sample Selection. N is the number of observations and N (Unique) is the unique firms.  
 
From the IPO prospectuses we collected information about the length of the lock-
up agreements, the lock-up expiration date, total number of outstanding shares, 
the amount of shares locked-up and whether or not Secondary Shares were sold in 
the offering. We checked the total number of shares against the list changes 
provided on the Oslo Stock Exchange webpage. In addition, we used NewsWeb to 
determine whether the potential overallotment options were fully utilized or not.  
 
The Department of Finance at BI Norwegian Business School provided us with 
information regarding the first day of trading, daily return (accounted for 
dividend) and volume, market value of equity, book-to-market ratio of equity 
(BM), initial midpoint offering price, final offering price, whether the company 
was backed by Venture Capitalists or not, and whether the company had an 
Seasoned Equity Offering (SEO) after the IPO, but before lock-up expiry. In 
addition, they provided a value-weighted index of the stocks listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, which we used as the market benchmark.  
 
In the data from the Department of Finance at BI Norwegian Business School, 
there were some missing data regarding the book-to-market ratio of equity. In 
these cases, we calculated the BM based on the information provided in the IPO 
prospectuses.  
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4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
To summarize the data we have gathered, we will present descriptive statistics to 
describe the main characteristics of the typical firm using lock-up agreements, 
examine possible time trend for lock-ups and frequency of lock-up lengths, as 
well as exploring the cross sectional differences in percentage of shares locked-up 
and the length of the lock-up agreements.  
4.1.1 Firm Characteristics 
The typical firm in our sample has an average market capitalization, adjusted to 
2000 level, of NOK 3.456 billion, while the median market capitalization is NOK 
725 million. Because a few companies, such as Statoil, Telenor and REC, have 
extremely high market capitalization, we will use the median market capitalization 
as the appropriate descriptive measure. Further, the typical firm has a book-to-
market ratio of equity of 0.40, is taken public by an underwriter with rank 7, and 
locks-up approximately 40 percent of their shares for 180 days. The 25th 
percentile, 75th percentile, as well as mean and median is presented in table 2 
below.  
 
 Firm characteristics  
(Full Sample) 
25
th
 
Percentile 
Median Mean 75
th
 
Percentile 
MV of Equity (in millions)
 
335 725 3 456 1 664 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.26 0.40 0.44 0.55 
Underwriter Rank (1-10) 6.00 7.00 6.76 7.00 
Lock-up Length (Days) 180 180 267 360 
Fraction Locked (%) 13.91 39.01 37.38 55.54 
Table 2: Firm Characteristics. 
4.1.2 Time Trend 
When sorting our lock-up observations into the respective years of the IPO, we 
see a clear pattern of time-clustering. These findings are not very surprising, as 
the time-clustering of IPOs is extensively documented, among others, by Ibbotson 
and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984). The former conclude that periods of high IPO 
volume are likely to be followed by another period of high IPO volume, while the 
latter find that IPO waves can be attributed to industries.  For example, the high 
number of observations in 2000 is to a large extent attributed to the boom of high-
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tech companies going public. The annual number of lock-up observations is 
presented in table 3 below.  
 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
N 
Fraction 
2 
22 % 
2 
15 % 
1 
8 % 
4 
33 % 
16 
41 % 
8 
33 % 
4 
44 % 
21 
70 % 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
N 
Fraction 
7 
41 % 
2 
40 % 
1 
20 % 
18 
62 % 
28 
65 % 
26 
74 % 
28 
49 % 
6 
43 % 
Table 3: Time Trend – N is the Annual number of lock-up observations (1993-2008). Fraction is the 
number of lock-ups in a given year, divided by all IPOs in the same year.  
4.1.3 Frequency of Lock-up Length 
The most frequent lock-up length is 180 days, used in approximately 40 percent of 
the total observations in our sample. The lock-up length in our sample appears to 
be clustering around quarterly or annual intervals, such as 90, 180 or 270 days and 
1, 2 or 3 years. This tendency is consistent with the observations from the US and 
Germany, where Brav and Gompers (2000) and Goergen, Renneboog and 
Khursted (2006) observed a lock-up length of 180 days in respectively 68 and 47 
percent of the cases. A summary of the frequencies of lock-up length is presented 
in table 4.  
 
Days <90 90 91-
179 
180 181-
269 
270 271-
359 
360 >360 
N 2 9 15 67 8 8 20 28 17 
% 1 5 9 39 5 5 11 16 10 
Table 4: Frequency of Lock-up Length – N is the number of a given observations and % is the fraction 
the given number represents out of the entire sample.  
 
We find that a lock-up length of exactly 180 days is more common in the later 
stages of our sample period. By assessing the periods before and after 2001, we 
find that a lock-up length of 180 days is used in respectively 17 and 49 percent of 
the cases.  Dividing the sample further into two time groups, 2001-2004 and 
2005-2008, we find that the fractions consisting of 180 days are respectively 43 
and 51 percent. Thus, the length of lock-up agreements seems to trend towards a 
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standardization of 180 days. Field and Hanka (2001) find a similar trend in the US 
market, where more than 90 percent of the lock-up lengths are exactly 180 days 
after 1996. We have no complete explanation as to why the standardization seems 
to lag behind in Norway. However, one plausible explanation is that the US is 
likely the most researched market in world, and thus one of the early pioneers. 
Then later, Norwegian firms (more specifically in this case, the underwriters 
operation in the Norwegian market) will imitate the US trend.  
4.1.4 Cross-sectional Differences in Fraction and Length 
In order to test for cross-sectional differences in our sample, we divided the full 
sample into different criterion-determined subsamples. First, we will present the 
major findings. Then, we will give a short interpretation, as well as relating our 
results to the findings in other countries, mainly the US. A summary of the results 
is presented in table 5.  
 N Days 
Locked 
Percentage 
Locked (%) 
Full Sample
 
174 267 [180] 37.38 [39.01] 
Market Value ≥ Median 
Market Value < Median 
p-value  
87 
87 
 
255 [180] 
279 [180] 
0.3414 
40.00 [43.86] 
34.75 [34.86] 
0.1608 
Venture Capital-backed 
Not Venture Capital-backed 
p-value  
26 
148 
209 [180] 
277 [180] 
0.0467** 
41.95 [43.39] 
36.58 [38.52] 
0.3068 
IPOs before 2001 
IPOs after 2001 
p-value  
58 
116 
324 [294] 
239 [180] 
0.0010** 
39.56 [41.44] 
36.29 [37.33] 
0.4111 
Book-to-market ≥ Median 
Book-to-market < Median 
p-value  
87 
87 
264 [180] 
270 [265] 
0.7918 
39.92 [44.70] 
34.83 [34.26] 
0.1740 
Underwriter Rank ≥ Median 
Underwriter Rank < Median 
p-value  
90 
84 
247 [180] 
288 [265] 
0.0935* 
33.95 [30.51] 
41.05 [44.06] 
0.05756* 
Table 5: Subsamples: Descriptive statistics of subsamples. The numbers reported are average [median]  
* Significant at a 10% level using a two-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a two-sided test 
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Full Sample 
The typical firm in our sample locks-up approximately 40 percent of their shares 
for 180 days. Comparing our findings to studies conducted in the US market, we 
see that while the typical length of the lock-up agreement is the same, Norwegian 
lock-up agreements seem to lock-up a smaller fraction of shares than American 
lock-up agreements, respectively 40 percent and 60-65 percent (e.g. Brav and 
Gompers 200) and Field and Hanka 2001). In addition, Norwegian firms also 
seem to lock-up a smaller fraction than German, French and UK firms, who lock-
up respectively 52, 59 and 44 percent, according to Goergen, Renneboog and 
Khursted (2006) and Espenlaub et al. (2001). The finding that Norwegian firms 
tend to lock-up a smaller percentage of their shares, ceteris paribus, is potentially 
consistent with the size explanation, e.g. that US firms in average are larger than 
Norwegian firms. 
 
Size 
In order to assess the cross-sectional differences when accounting for firm size, as 
measured by the market value of equity, adjusted to year 2000 level, we split the 
sample into two groups. The first group is the firms where the size is larger than 
or equal to the median. The second group is the firms which are smaller than the 
median. As documented by several papers, e.g. Brav and Gompers (2000), we 
find, although not statistically significant, that smaller firms lock-up their shares 
for a longer period. In addition, the smaller firms lock-up a smaller fraction of 
their shares. These differences are typically attributed to two explanations. First, 
smaller firms are potentially associated with higher asymmetric information. 
Thus, in order to reduce the impact of the asymmetric information, smaller firms 
are willing to lock-up their shares for a longer time. Second, smaller firms tend to 
offer a higher percentage of their shares in the IPO, leaving the pre-IPO 
shareholders with a smaller stake in the company, and thus a smaller percentage 
locked-up. While we cannot prove these to be exhaustive explanations for the 
findings, we accept them as plausible explanations for the cross-sectional 
differences in firm size.  
 
Time 
To assess the cross-sectional differences in time, we divided the sample into two 
subsamples, where the first sample is from 1993 to 2000 and the second sample is 
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from 2001 to 2008. We see that the early sample of lock-up agreements have 
statistically significant longer lock-up periods, while there are no significant 
differences in the percentage of shares locked-up. These findings are contradicting 
the findings by Brav and Gompers (2000), who found no descriptive time-trend in 
the US market. One possible explanation for these differences is that they studied 
a shorter, as well as earlier, time-period. 
 
Venture Capitalist 
In order to assess whether there exists any cross-sectional differences when 
accounting for whether a firm was Venture Capital-backed or not, we split the full 
sample into two subsamples. The first subsample consists of firms backed by 
Venture Capitalists, while the second consists of the firms that were not Venture 
Capital-backed. We find that the firms backed by a Venture Capitalist enter lock-
up agreements which are statistically significant shorter than for firms which were 
not backed by a Venture Capitalist. In addition, while not statistically significant, 
the Venture Capital-backed firms lock-up a higher percentage of their shares. 
Although the percentage of firms in our sample backed by Venture Capitalists is 
considerably smaller than in the US sample used by Field and Hanka (2001), 
respectively 15 and 48 percent, the findings are similar. Baker and Gompers 
(1999) find that Venture Capitalists help overcome informational problems and 
thus reduce the information asymmetry in the firms which they invest in. Further, 
Brav and Gompers (2000), argues that the potential adverse selection problem 
should be lower, since Venture Capitalists repeatedly bring companies public, and 
therefore wish to maintain the reputation they have developed. Accepting these 
explanations as plausible, we should expect that Venture Capital-backed firms are 
associated with less asymmetric information and adverse selection, and thus 
shorter lock-up lengths on average.  
 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
Dividing the full sample into subsamples of firms above and below the median 
book-to-market ratio, we see that firms with high book-to-market ratio have a 
shorter lock-up length, and also have a higher percentage of their shares locked-
up. These findings are consistent with the ones found in the US, where Brav and 
Gompers (2000) argues that a low book-to-market ratio is associated with higher 
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information asymmetry, and thus we should expect a longer lock-up period for 
firms with a low book-to-market ratio.  
 
Underwriter Rank 
Again, dividing the full sample into two subsamples, one above and one below the 
median of underwriter rank, we see that the firms going public using the highest 
ranked underwriters, have considerably (statistically significant at 10 percent 
level) shorter lock-up periods and a smaller fraction of their shares locked-up. 
While the shorter lock-up periods for firms using a higher ranked underwriter are 
consistent with the findings in the US markets, the smaller fraction locked-up is 
not. The rationale behind the shorter lock-up period for companies using a highly 
ranked underwriter is similar to the explanations for venture capital-backed firms. 
Like Venture Capitalists, underwriters repeatedly bring firms public, and thus 
should be careful to maintain their reputation. Therefore, a highly ranked 
underwriter would typically bring a high quality firm, which can be associated 
with lower information asymmetry and adverse selection problem, public. 
Because the information asymmetric and adverse selection problem is expected to 
be lower, there is less need to lock-up the shares for a long period.  
 
In sum, we have shown that the typical lock-up agreement lasts for 180 days and 
consists of approximately 40 percent of the shares, which is lower than the 
equivalent fraction documented in respectively France, Germany, UK and the US. 
In general, we find that the lock-up length is shorter and the fraction of shares 
locked-up is higher in the subsamples where we expect the information 
asymmetry and adverse selection problem to be less severe. The reason for this 
could be that firms associated with a higher degree of information asymmetry tend 
to sell a higher fraction of their shares in the IPO (e.g. they are on average 
smaller) and consequently have fewer shares remaining to lock-up. Therefore, 
they must accept longer lock-up periods. With the exception of underwriter rank, 
we find that the percentage locked-up is negatively related to the lock-up length. 
This is identical to the findings of Brav and Gompers (2000), who argues that a 
firm can commit by either locking-up more shares or be accepting a longer lock-
up period.   
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Having presented data description, sample selection and descriptive statistics, we 
will now present the methodology.  
5 Methodology  
In this section, we will present the methodology. First we will present the 
dependent variables. Then, we present the independent variables, as well as the 
control variables. Lastly, we will go through and test the underlying assumptions 
of OLS-regressions.  
 
In the first regression, our main focus will be to test if there are any cross-
sectional differences in abnormal return. Through a regression with abnormal 
returns at expiration as the dependent variable, we can shed light on the first 
prediction of the commitment hypothesis of lock-ups and the theory of downward 
sloping demand curves for stocks. It is also economically interesting to explore 
whether different features of the stock or the lock-up contract can be used to 
predict abnormal returns and give anomalous evidence against market efficiency.  
 
The explanatory variables will be several firm characteristics and stock 
characteristics which have received empirical support from existing literature, 
such as Brav and Gompers (2000/2003), Field and Hanka (2001) and Ofek and 
Richardson (2000). The variables relevant for the theory of downward sloping 
demand curves are the ones who can be seen as proxy for the greater number of 
shares hitting the market at the event day, and include VC-backing, abnormal 
volume and the percentage of shares locked. The variables relevant for the 
commitment hypothesis are the stock price volatility, the underwriter ranking, 
whether there were offered secondary shares in the IPO, whether the firm 
performed an SEO, the book-to-market ratio and the market value of equity. 
These variables are relevant since they all have implications for the level of 
information asymmetry at lock-up expiration. In the regressions for abnormal 
returns, the control variables include the price run-up of the firm’s stock and the 
number of lock-up days. We have applied the natural logarithm to some of the 
variables in order to reduce excess skewness and kurtosis.  
 
We will also perform a regression on determinants of lock-up length in order to 
explore the commitment hypothesis further, and briefly test the additional 
underwriter compensation hypothesis. In correspondence with Brav and Gompers 
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(2003) the independent variables are chosen to address issues related to 
information asymmetry. These include VC-backing, the market value of equity, 
the book-to-market ratio and the underwriter rank. The regression also includes 
the control variables percentage of shares locked and a dummy variable for 
before/after 2001.  
5.1 Dependent Variables 
Depending on the regression, we have two dependent variables.  The first 
regression has the three-day cumulative abnormal return around lock-up 
expiration as the dependent variable, while the second regression has number as 
lock-up days as its dependent variable.  
 
Cumulative Abnormal Return around Lock-up Expiry 
The three-day cumulative abnormal return around lock-up expiration is the 
dependent variable in the first regression analysis. We will calculate the 
cumulative logarithmic returns from one day prior to one day following the lock-
up expiration of each individual lock-up. The 3-day time window we use 
corresponds to the window used by e.g. Field and Hanka (2001), and the purpose 
of adding days to the event window is due to the fact that, in some instances, the 
exact lock-up expiry date is ambiguous. Further, from each individual return, we 
will then subtract the benchmark index cumulative logarithmic return for the same 
three days, and this will represent abnormal return around expiration for each 
lock-up. Initially, we intended to compute the abnormal return using the market 
model. However, previous literature (e.g. Brav and Gompers (2000), Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) and Field and Hanka (2001)) consistently use realized return 
and benchmark index, ignoring the beta, to compute abnormal return. In addition, 
Kothari and Shanken (1998) find that the economical differences, particularly in 
the short-run, are small. Thus, we chose our definition of abnormal return as 
follows: 
             
 
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i on day t, Rit is the logarithmic return 
of stock i on day t, and RIt is the logarithmic return on the benchmark index I on 
day t. The variable has been winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent tails. 
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Number of Lock-up Days 
The number of lock-up days will be used as a dependent variable in the regression 
of lock-up length, in order to shed further light on the commitment hypothesis and 
the additional underwriter compensation hypothesis. The distribution of days is 
highly clustered around six and twelve months. Consequently, we have applied 
the natural logarithm to the variable in order to improve its fit with a normal 
distribution.  
5.2 Independent Variables 
In order to shed light on the theory of downward sloping demand curves and 
market efficiency, we have used many of the same independent variables as Field 
and Hanka (2001) and Ofek and Richardson (2000).  To explore the commitment 
hypothesis of lock-up agreements, we have used many of the same variables as 
Brav and Gompers (2003). 
5.2.1 Testing of Downward Sloping Demand Curves 
VC-backing 
The first independent variable of our regression is a dummy variable, equal to one 
if the company is venture capital backed, and zero otherwise. Employing the 
reasoning of Brav and Gompers (2000), VC-backing proxies for a greater number 
of shares sold by insiders at lockup expiration, and will thus shed light on the 
theory of downward sloping demand curves. Gompers and Lerner (1998) report 
that most VCs are required to distribute securities in the companies that go public 
once lock-ups expire. The investors of venture capital funds are not considered 
insiders, and have no restrictions to immediately sell their equity positions. Thus 
we expect venture capital backing to increase the negative abnormal return, unless 
this effect is rationally expected by investors. In our sample, we found that 26 of 
the lock-ups were venture capital-financed, while 148 lock-ups were not. 
 
Three-day Abnormal Volume  
The next variable in the regression is the three-day cumulative abnormal volume 
around the lock-up expiration. If demand curves for stocks are downward sloping, 
this variable will put a negative pressure on the stock price if investor’s prior 
beliefs are consistently wrong about how many stocks are hitting the market (Brav 
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and Gompers 2003). Our definition of the abnormal volume corresponds to the 
definition used by Field and Hanka (2001):  
                
        
            
  
 
Where 3AVexpiry is the three-day abnormal volume around lockup expiration, 
AVexpiry is the three day average volume around lock-up expiration, and AVhistorical 
is the three day average volume for day -61 to day -11. Further, the variable has 
been winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent tails.  
 
Percentage of Shares Locked 
Similar to the VC-backing variable, this variable is intended to proxy for a greater 
number of shares to hit the market at the time of the lockup expiration (Brav and 
Gompers 2000), and will consequently be related to the theory of  downward 
sloping demand curves combined with incorrect prior beliefs of how many stocks 
are hitting the market. According to theory, we are expecting a negative 
coefficient for the variable.  
 
The variable will also, in accordance with Brav and Gompers (2000 and 2003) be 
used as a control variable in the regression of lock-up length, since a firm can 
commit by either locking-up more shares or accepting a longer lock-up period.   
5.2.2 Testing of the Commitment Hypothesis 
VC-backing 
The variable VC-backing is according to Brav and Gompers (2003), associated 
with less information asymmetry, and is then expected to play an important role in 
the regression of lock-up length to test the commitment hypothesis.  
 
Stock Price Volatility 
Like Ofek and Richardson (2000), we computed the stock price volatility as the 
standard deviation of returns from the day of the IPO until day t-6. We also 
adjusted the stock price volatility into annual terms. This variable will shed light 
on Brav and Gompers’ (2003) commitment-hypothesis for the existence of lock-
ups, as price volatility could proxy for information asymmetry. Stock price 
volatility will thus be applied both in the regression for abnormal returns and in 
the regression for lock-up length. This variable is also related to the supply side of 
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the stock due to diversification needs (Ofek and Richardson 2000). The rationale 
is that a large volatility of the stock price will cause the investor to face greater 
asset risk, thus wanting to sell the stock to reduce their portfolio risk. Both of the 
arguments predict a negative price pressure at lock-up expiration from higher 
stock volatility. We have applied the natural logarithm to the data series, in order 
to get it closer to a normal distribution.  
 
Underwriter Rank 
The variable underwriter rank is used as a proxy for lower information 
asymmetry, corresponding Brav and Gompers’s (2000 and 2003) claim that 
higher underwriter rank is associated with higher firm transparency. The variable 
will provide evidence concerning the commitment hypothesis using the regression 
of abnormal returns. The hypothesis predicts, after controlling for other factors, a 
smaller price drop for firms with higher underwriter rank. 
 
The underwriter rank will also be used as an independent variable in the 
regression of lock-up length, since firms with higher information asymmetry have 
greater potential to take advantage of outside investors, and thus will need to 
commit with a longer lock-up period. However, the additional underwriter 
compensation hypothesis predicts the opposite direction, as it claims that high 
quality underwriters will use their greater prestige to extract more compensation 
by imposing longer lock-up periods (Brav and Gompers 2003).  
 
The underwriter rank variable is calculated based on each underwriter’s respective 
market share. Our sample period is divided into three sub-periods: 1993-2000, 
2001-2004 and 2005-2008. First, for each IPO within a sub-period, the 
underwriter has been attributed a share equal to the gross proceeds. If several 
underwriters were involved in the same IPO, the underwriters have been given an 
equal share of the gross proceeds. Lastly, they have been ranked by their total 
gross proceeds for the respective sub-period. This ranking method of underwriters 
corresponds to the method used by Field and Hanka (2001). The underwriter 
ranking for each period is available in appendix 1. The variable is for regression 
purposes calculated as follows: 
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Secondary Shares in IPO 
This is a dummy variable equal to one if there were sold secondary shares in the 
IPO, zero otherwise. Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that insiders selling 
secondary shares in the IPO are less likely to sell shares at the lock-up expiry, and 
thus information asymmetry is expected reduced. Consequently, this leads to 
smaller price drops. Since the variable is related to information asymmetry, the 
results concerning this variable will provide insight regarding the commitment 
hypothesis of the existence of lock-ups.  In our sample, 84 of the lock-ups were 
registered with sale of secondary shares in the IPO, while 90 lock-ups were not. 
 
SEO after IPO but Before Lock-up Expiry 
This is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm did a seasoned equity offering 
after the IPO but before the lock-up expiration, zero otherwise. Brav and Gompers 
(2003) argue that insiders in firms that perform a SEO are less likely to sell shares 
at the lock-up expiration, and hence reducing the information asymmetry problem. 
We expect smaller price drops for firms having an SEO after the IPO but before 
the lock-up expiration. In our sample 42 of the cases included an SEO while 132 
did not.  
 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
A lower book-to-market ratio is used as a proxy for higher information 
asymmetry, as pointed out by Brav and Gompers (2000) and will therefore 
provide testing of the commitment hypothesis. Thus, after controlling for other 
factors, we expect lower book to market firms to have larger price drops. 
Moreover, low book-to-market ratios are usually associated by fast growing firms, 
and it is possible that investors are consistently surprised by high insider sales in 
such firms, again leading to larger price drops. The natural logarithm is applied to 
this variable in order to improve the fit with a normal distribution.  
 
Since this variable is associated with information asymmetry, it will also be 
applied as an explanatory variable in the regression of lock-up length to test the 
commitment hypothesis. 
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Market Value of Equity 
As pointed out earlier, smaller firms are potentially associated with higher 
asymmetric information, and are therefore interesting in order to test the 
commitment hypothesis. After controlling for other factors, we will expect that 
firms with smaller market value of equity will experience higher price drops. 
However, Brav and Gompers (2000) and Field and Hanka (2001) do not find 
significant results from this variable. The natural logarithm of the variable is 
applied in order to improve its fit with a normal distribution.  
 
The market value of equity variable will also serve as a proxy for information 
asymmetry in the regression of lock-up length, in order to test the commitment 
hypothesis. 
5.2.3 Control Variables 
Run-up 
The price run-up variable is used as a control variable in our regression, and is 
related to the supply side of the share. Odean (1998) finds that investors have a 
tendency to hold onto losers, and consequently sell winners. Moreover, Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) argue that the main motivation for selling shares at lock-up 
expiration seem to be diversification needs. Thus the price run-up can proxy for 
such diversification needs, as a run-up of an individual share will induce the 
investors to rebalance their portfolio in order to deal with higher portfolio risk. On 
the other hand, if investors tend to sell losers due to tax-benefits, there will be 
selling pressure for the shares that have performed poorly. Empirics will show 
which effect is the strongest. We have calculated the variable as the price run-up 
from the offering price until the stock price at day -6. The numbers are based on 
logarithmic returns data for each stock. 
 
Dummy Variable for Before/After 2001 
This variable is only added to the regression of lock-up length, in order to account 
for the results in the descriptive part, where we found that the early sample of 
lock-up agreements have statistically significant longer lock-up periods than the 
most recent lock-up agreements. The dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 for 
all lock-ups after 2001, otherwise zero. Brav and Gompers (2003) also accounted 
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for the time effect in their regression of lock-up length, applying an annual time 
dummy.  
 
Dummy Variable for Lock-up Length Shorter than Predicted 
This dummy variable appears in the regression for abnormal returns, and accounts 
for the effect that if the lock-up length is correctly set, there might be no price 
reaction at lock-up expiration since the information asymmetry is dealt with. The 
dummy variable takes the value 1 if the lock-up length is shorter than predicted by 
the lock-up length regression, zero otherwise. We expect a negative relationship, 
since shorter lock-ups than predicted might leave some information asymmetry at 
lock-up expiration to put downward pressure on the stock when insiders exit. 
5.3 Testing the Underlying Assumptions of the OLS-
procedure 
In our research we will employ OLS-regression to explore differences in 
abnormal returns and to explore determinants of lock-up length, therefore we first 
assess whether the models fulfill the underlying assumptions of the OLS-
procedure.  
 
The consequences of ignoring heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the error 
terms would cause a too easy rejection of the null hypothesis (Brooks 2008). To 
deal with this problem, each regression suffering from either heteroscedasticity or 
autocorrelation has been provided with heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation 
consistent standard errors (HAC), resulting in a more conservative hypothesis 
testing. This applies to both the regression of abnormal returns and the regression 
of lock-up length.  
 
The assumption of no multicollinearity is also tested in our models through 
matrices of correlation for each sample. The correlation-matrix for the explanatory 
variables in the regression of abnormal returns is available in appendix 2, where 
we see that the highest correlation is -0.358. We need to be aware that the 
individual explanatory variables may not be significant since it is potentially 
difficult to isolate the contribution of each variable. As a consequence, there 
might be difficult to draw sharp inferences (Brooks 2008). The highest correlation 
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for the regression of lock-up length is 0.230, which is probably low enough to 
make reasonable inferences about the individual variables.  
 
Another important assumption underlying the OLS-procedure is the one of 
normality in the disturbance terms. Initially, we winsorized the excess volume and 
abnormal returns data at the 1 percent and the 99 percent tails in order to cope 
with the effect of outliers. We also applied the natural logarithm to several of the 
variables. However, in the Jarque-Bera test, we had to reject the null of normality 
at the 5% level for both the regression of abnormal returns and the regression of 
lock-up length. If we remove more outliers we would only artificially improve the 
fit of the model. Furthermore, there is to our knowledge no theoretical 
justification for introducing a dummy variable for extreme abnormal returns at 
lock-up expiration. Deciding to proceed with the data set, we take notice that the 
non-normality might have an undue effect on the coefficient estimates (Brooks 
2008). 
 
The regressions also embody the implicit assumption that the coefficient estimates 
are constant through time (Brooks 2008). This assumption is tested on the 
abnormal returns regression with a cut-off point at primo 2001, and the Chow test 
reports an F-statistic of 1.04, indicating stable parameters through time. The same 
test is also applied to the regression of lock-up length, and the Chow test reports 
an F-statistic of 3.10, which strongly rejects parameter stability at the 1% level. 
This is consistent with our findings in the descriptive part, that early sample of 
lock-up agreements have statistically significant longer lock-up periods. To 
control for this effect, we have added a dummy variable in a second regression to 
account for IPOs before/after 2001. 
 
Finally, we tested the underlying assumption that the appropriate functional form 
is linear (Brooks 2008). Initially we applied the natural logarithm to several of the 
variables in order to deal with possible non-linear relationships. Performing a 
Ramsey RESET test (Ramsey 1969), we are not able to find any non-linearity in 
the regression equations either for abnormal returns or lock-up length. The F-
statistic reports 2.10 and 0.25 respectively, and we conclude that the linear model 
is appropriate.  
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Having presented the methodology, we will present the empirical results we 
obtained.  
6 Empirical Evidence and Interpretation 
In this section we present the results and empirical evidence of our analysis, give 
an interpretation of the results, and then compare our results to the findings in 
other countries, mainly the US. First, we present the results regarding event-day 
abnormal return and volume. Then, we proceed with presenting the cross-
sectional differences in abnormal returns and the determinants of lock-up length.  
6.1 Event-day Abnormal Return and Volume 
The first tests we performed were the event-day abnormal return and volume. 
These tests were intended to test market efficiency, downward sloping demand 
curves and incorrect prior beliefs/costly arbitrage. A summary of the results are 
presented in table 6 below.  
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 N Fraction 
CAR 
Negative 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Return 
(%) 
Abnormal 
Volume  
(%) 
Full Sample 
p-value
 
174 51 0.35  
0.5317 
89.50 
0.0100** 
Market Value ≥ Median 
Market Value < Median 
p-value  
87 
87 
 
55  
46  
-0.28  
0.97  
0.2592 
69.44  
109.56  
0.5612 
VC-backed 
Not VC-backed 
p-value  
26 
148 
50  
51  
-0.99  
0.58  
0.3129 
56.72  
95.26  
0.6907 
IPOs before 2001 
IPOs after 2001 
p-value  
58 
116 
48  
52  
0.25  
0.39  
0.9066 
94.40  
87.05  
0.9201 
BM ≥ Median 
BM < Median 
p-value  
87 
87 
51  
51  
0.84  
-0.14  
0.3756 
125.37  
53.63  
0.2982 
U.R. ≥ Median 
U.R. < Median 
p-value  
90 
84 
56  
45  
0.13  
0.58  
0.6812 
83.12  
96.35  
0.8482 
Price has Risen 
Price has Fallen  
p-value  
82 
92 
57  
45  
-0.04  
0.69  
0.5073 
50.29  
124.45  
0.2830 
Table 6: 3-day Abnormal Return and Volume 
* Significant at a 10% level using a two-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a two-sided test 
 
Full Sample 
For the full sample, we find that the 3-day abnormal return is positive, being 0.35 
percent, and statistically insignificant. Further, we find a statistically significant 
and positive 3-day abnormal volume of 89.50 percent. In order to determine 
whether the increased trading volume is only temporary or permanent, we 
compared the average trading volume prior to the event (day -61 through -11) 
with the average trading volume following the event (day 11 through 42). We find 
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a statistically significant increase in trading volume of 85 percent, thus the 
abnormal volume seems to be permanent rather than mean-reverting. The positive 
abnormal return is contradicting the findings in the US, where a negative event-
day abnormal return is widely documented. The positive abnormal volume, on the 
other hand, is corresponding with the evidence from the US market, where e.g. 
Field and Hanka (2001) found an event-day abnormal volume of 80 percent and a 
permanent increase in trading volume of 40 percent. We note, however, that while 
the temporary abnormal volume is similar to our findings, the permanent and 
long-term increase in trading volume seems to revert more in the US. A possible 
explanation for this difference is that we use a slightly shorter time-window, and 
thus might not capture the entire reversion effect.  
 
As earlier noted, the exact lock-up expiry dates are, in some instances, ambiguous.  
Therefore, as a robustness test, we have explored abnormal return and volume for 
other time windows, such as 5-day and 6-day. The results are presented in table 7 
below.    
 
Time window Abnormal Return 
(%) 
Abnormal Volume 
(%) 
3-day [-1 to +1] 
p-value
 
0.35  
0.5317 
89.50 
0.0100** 
5-day [-2 to +2] 
p-value  
0.42  
0.4808 
70.42  
0.0000*** 
6-day [0 to +5] 
p-value  
-1.49  
0.0335* 
57.19  
0.0124** 
Table 7: Robustness test of Abnormal Return and Volume. Numbers in brackets represent the event 
window, where 0 is the expiry date.  
* Significant at a 10% level using a two-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a two-sided test 
*** Significant at a 1% level using a two-sided test 
 
We see that the results are virtually unchanged with respect to the 5-day abnormal 
return and volume. In contrast, the 6-day abnormal return, which is the abnormal 
return from day 0 to day +5, is negative and both significantly and economically 
significant. There are several possible explanations for the negative 6-day event 
window. First, in our sample, small firms often experience several consecutive 
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days with no trading. Consequently, by expanding the event window, the 
likelihood of trades of small firms increase, thus influencing the abnormal return. 
Second, investors may need some time to organize and/or facility the sale of their 
shares, thus creating a gap between the practical (the day they actually start selling 
shares) and theoretical (the day which they are allowed to start selling shares) 
lock-up expiry. In that case, the price reaction should be visible in the days 
following the expiry. In particular, a gap between the sale of shares and the lock-
up expiry is reasonable for VC-backed firms, where the VC must distribute the 
shares to their own investors before the sale happens.  
 
Brav and Gompers (2000) argue that, in an efficient market, investors should 
guess the number of shares sold at expiry correctly on average. Consequently, 
some returns should be positive and some should be negative at expiry, but on 
average the abnormal return should be insignificantly different from zero. In this 
context, we see that approximately half of the returns in our sample are negative, 
and that the abnormal return is insignificantly different from zero. Based on our 
results, it therefore seems that investor’s prior beliefs are correct, and we thus 
conclude that our results give support to the efficient market hypothesis. In 
contrast, although we cannot dismiss the theory, we find no support for downward 
sloping demand curves. In addition, we find no support for costly arbitrage.  
 
Size 
To assess whether there are any differences when accounting for size, we divided 
the full sample into two groups, one above and one below the median. We see 
from the results that the firms with market value above the median have a 
negative abnormal return of 0.28 percent, and the firms below the median have a 
positive abnormal return of 0.97 percent. While the differences are not statistically 
significant, they are economically interesting. The observation that large firms 
seems to have a relative lower abnormal return than smaller firms at expiry is 
consistent with the results from the US. More specifically, Brav and Gompers 
(2000), find that abnormal return is lower (i.e. more negative) for firms where 
information asymmetry and adverse selection problem is less severe, such as 
larger size. Further, we find that smaller firms have a higher abnormal volume 
than larger firms, respectively 109.56 and 69.44 percent. These results are 
contradicting the observations from the US market, where they found that larger 
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firms had higher negative abnormal return. A possible explanation why our 
results, with respect to abnormal volume, differ from the results in the US market 
is that we have not found any proof for a negative correlation between return and 
volume in our data. As we pointed out in the descriptive statistics part, larger 
firms lock-up a higher percentage than smaller firms, respectively 40 and 34 
percent. Larger firms will therefore have a larger fraction unlocked at the expiry 
date, and thus have a larger amount of shares available for trading. The results 
obtained, with respect to size, is therefore potentially supporting downward 
sloping demand curves. In order to test the robustness of the data, we also 
explored the 5-day abnormal return and volume. The results were consistent with 
the 3-day results.   
 
Venture Capitalist 
In order to examine the effect of Venture Capital-backing, we divided the full 
sample into two subsamples, one with and one without Venture Capital-backing. 
We find that firms backed by a Venture Capitalist experience an insignificant, but 
economically interesting, negative abnormal return of 1 percent. Firms without 
VC-backing, on the other hand, experienced a positive abnormal return of 0.58 
percent. The evidence that Venture Capital-backed firms experience a relative 
lower abnormal return is widely documented in the US, e.g. by Bradley et al. 
(2001). Further, we see VC-backed firms experience a lower 3-day abnormal 
volume than firms without VC-backing, respectively 57 and 95 percent. This is 
contrary to the findings made by Brav and Gompers (2000) in the US market, 
which found that the abnormal volume was higher for VC-backed firms. 
Assessing the robustness of the findings, we also explored the 5-day abnormal 
return and volume. We then find that the abnormal volume is higher for VC-
backed firms, which is exactly the same as found in the US. Gompers and Lerner 
(1998) note that many Venture Capitalists are required to distribute the shares in 
the firm going public to their own investors once the lock-up expires. We believe 
that a potential time-lag from the initiation until the completion of the transfer can 
potentially explain why the 3-day abnormal volume is lower for VC-backed firms, 
while the 5-day abnormal volume is higher. Brav and Gompers (2000) further 
argue that the investors in the VC-firms often have an automatic sell-policy when 
receiving the distributed shares, and therefore contributing to the negative 
abnormal return. In contrast, we find that when VCs potentially distribute and 
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their own investors subsequently sell the shares, the 5-day positive abnormal 
return is higher for the VC-backed firms than for firms not VC-backed, 
respectively 1 and 0.32 percent.  A possible explanation for this is that we did not 
find a negative correlation between return and volume. The results, where higher 
abnormal volume seems to give a higher positive abnormal return, gives no 
support to the downward sloping demand curve theory.  
 
Time 
Dividing the sample into two subsamples, consisting of the IPOs before and after 
2001, we find that both subsamples have positive abnormal returns. There does 
not seem to be any significant differences with respect to time-trend, and the 
results are consistent with the 5-day abnormal return and volume. Further, the 
results are consistent with the results from the US, e.g. Brav and Gompers (2000).  
 
Book-to-Market Ratio 
Examining the firms with book-to-market ratio above and below the median we 
see that firms with a lower BM-ratio experience lower abnormal return than firms 
with a high BM-ratio, although the differences are not statistically significant. 
This is consistent with the commitment hypothesis by Brav and Gompers (2003), 
which predicts that firms with higher information asymmetry (i.e. low BM), in 
general, are associated with a lower abnormal return at expiry. Further, we see 
that firms with a higher BM-ratio are associated with higher abnormal volume. 
Again, this can potentially be explained by the fact that we do not find a negative 
correlation between return and volume. In addition, testing the robustness of the 
findings, the results are consistent when looking at the 5-day abnormal return and 
volume. We have earlier documented that firms with high BM-ratio locks-up a 
larger fraction of their shares, and seen in light of both higher abnormal return and 
volume, when comparing to firms with low BM-ratio, we find no support for 
downward sloping demand curve.  
 
Underwriter Rank 
Dividing the full sample into two subsamples, above and below the median of 
underwriter rank, we find that firms going public with the highest ranked 
underwriter experience, although insignificant, lower abnormal return and volume 
than firms going public with a low ranked underwriter.  
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The lower abnormal return is inconsistent with the prediction that firms with low 
information asymmetry and low adverse selection problem (i.e. going public with 
a highly reputable underwriter), in general, is associated with higher abnormal 
return. However, the results for the lower abnormal return are consistent with the 
initial findings of Brav and Gompers (2000), while the lower abnormal volume is 
not. The 5-day abnormal return is consistent with the 3-day abnormal return. 
However, looking at the 5-day abnormal volume, we find that the abnormal 
volume for the firms using the highest ranked underwriter is slightly higher than 
for firms using a lower ranked underwriter.  
 
Price Run-up 
We define the price run-up as the cumulative return from the IPO-day to the lock-
up expiry day. We then sorted the firms into subsamples, conditional upon 
whether the firm had experienced as positive run-up (i.e. price has risen) or a 
negative price run-up (i.e. price has fallen). We find that firms where price has 
risen experience a relative lower, although statistically insignificant, abnormal 
return than firms where the price has fallen. This finding is consistent with what 
Field and Hanka (2001) document in the US. We further see that abnormal 
volume is higher when the price has fallen. A possible explanation for this is the 
lack of negative correlation between return and volume in our data. In general, our 
results are potentially inconsistent with Odean (1998), who finds that investors 
have a tendency to hold onto losers, and consequently sell winners. Defining the 
firms with a negative price run-up as losers, we see that they have, contrary to 
previous findings, an economically significant higher abnormal volume than the 
winners (i.e. firms where price has risen). We can think of two plausible 
explanations as to why this is the case. First, pre-IPO shareholders and insiders 
might want to cash out at the first opportunity, as they may fear the stock price to 
decline further, making their claim less valuable. Second, investors might 
perceive it as a good opportunity to purchase a significant stake in the firm for a 
desirable price. In addition, testing the robustness of the data, the results remain 
the same when looking at the 5-day abnormal return and volume. 
 
Exploring the 3 and 5 day event-window at lock-up expiration, we have shown 
that the average abnormal return for the full sample is positive, although not 
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statistically significant. We have also shown that the abnormal volume is large, 
positive and statistically significant. Further, the positive abnormal volume does 
not seem to revert back to mean, and therefore the increase in trading volume 
seems to be permanent. While the increased trading volume is consistent with the 
findings in other countries, the positive abnormal return is not. However, 
examining the cumulative abnormal return for the period 10 days prior to and 10 
days following the lock-up expiration (table 8), we find a negative buy-and-hold 
return (Figure 1). Plotting the abnormal volume for the same time period (Figure 
2), we find that, not surprisingly, the trading volume trend upwards. In addition, 
from the figures, it seems that a relatively steep decline in cumulative abnormal 
return is immediately followed by an increase in trading volume.  
 Days from expiry AR (%) t-statistics CAR (%) t-statistics 
-10 0.12 0.92 0.12 0.92 
-9 -0.12 -0.33 0.00 0.69 
-8 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.59 
-7 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.69 
-6 -0.15 -0.16 -0.10 0.45 
-5 -0.65 -1.42 -0.75 -0.14 
-4 -0.44 -1.25 -1.19 -1.46 
-3 0.39 1.02 -0.80 -0.88 
-2 0.30 1.01 -0.50 0.11 
-1 0.29 0.64 -0.21 0.33 
0 -0.01 -0.62 -0.22 0.00 
+1 0.26 0.82 0.03 0.30 
+2 -0.49 -1.73 -0.45 -0.24 
+3 -0.14 -0.22 -0.60 -0.29 
+4 -0.54 -1.57 -1.13 -0.83 
+5 -0.56 -1.46 -1.69 -1.67 
+6 0.13 0.28 -1.56 -1.57 
+7 0.01 -0.05 -1.55 -1.60 
+8 0.09 0.36 -1.46 -1.32 
+9 -0.60 -1.73 -2.05 -1.77 
+10 0.02 0.09 -2.04 -1.73 
Table 8: Event-day abnormal return 
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Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Return for the period t-10 through t+10. 
 
Figure 2: Abnormal Trading Volume for the period t-10 through t+10.  
 
As pointed out earlier, previous empirical results show, contrary to the theoretical 
prediction (e.g. Brav and Gompers 2003), that firms where information 
asymmetry and adverse selection problem is less severe, would experience a 
relative lower abnormal return than firms associated with high information 
asymmetry and adverse selection problem. We find that this is the case for the 
larger firms, venture capital-backed firms and for firms using the highest ranked 
underwriters. In contrast, firms with a high book-to-market ratio experience 
higher abnormal return than firms with a low BM-ratio. In general, we find that a 
higher abnormal return is associated with higher abnormal volume. As we did not 
find a negative correlation between abnormal return and volume, this does not 
seem too surprising, even though it is contradicting the empirical results from 
other countries, mainly the US. In addition, we find that firms with a positive 
price run-up experience lower abnormal return than firms with a negative price 
run-up. Apart from the size subsample, we find little to no support for downward 
sloping demand curves. In general, and based on our results, we find that 
investor’s prior beliefs are correct, and we cannot dismiss the efficient market 
hypothesis, and thus we conclude that the market appears to be efficient.  
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6.2 Cross-sectional Differences in Abnormal Returns 
Even though the results from testing abnormal returns around expiration were 
rather ambiguous, it is still worthwhile to explore the cross-sectional differences 
in abnormal returns at lock-up expiration after controlling for other factors. This 
way we can test the first prediction of the commitment hypothesis regarding 
information asymmetry, and also test whether demand curves for stocks slope 
downward. 
 
The regression for abnormal returns is applied to three different event windows in 
order to provide robustness to the results. The results are shown in table 92: 
 Abnormal return 
 3-day [-1 to +1] 5-day [-2 to +2] 6-day [0 to +5] 
Intercept 0.078 
(1.27) 
0.123** 
(2.38) 
-0.147 
(-0.94) 
Log (1+ Three day 
A.V.) 
0.003 
(1.15) 
0.003 
(1.12) 
0.007* 
(2.04) 
Underwriter rank -0.084 
(-1.77) 
-0.0002 
(-0.003) 
-0.046 
(-0.67) 
Log (Book-to-market 
ratio) 
0.002 
(0.32) 
0.010 
(1.55) 
-0.018 
(-1.35) 
Log (Market value of 
equity) 
-0.015*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.010* 
(-2.09) 
-0.020* 
(-2.18) 
Log (Stock price run-
up) 
0.007 
(0.71) 
-0.005 
(-0.37) 
0.008 
(0.47) 
Log (Std dev of stock 
returns) 
-0.019 
(-0.98) 
0.011 
(0.58) 
-0.082 
(-1.34) 
Fraction of post-IPO 
shares locked up 
0.002 
(0.10) 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
0.047 
(1.37) 
Dummy variable for 
SEO after IPO but 
before lock-up 
expiration 
-0.022 
(-1.88) 
-0.014 
(-0.89) 
-0.015 
(-0.81) 
                                                 
2 In unreported results we run the regression with an interaction term for the VC-variable and the 
abnormal volume variable. The interaction term was not statistically significant (t-value 1.022), 
and the term was omitted in order to improve interpretation of the other variables. 
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Dummy variable for 
secondary shares in 
IPO 
-0.022 
(-1.94) 
-0.022 
(-1.94) 
-0.010 
(-0.69) 
Dummy variable for 
VC-backing 
-0.015 
(-0.92) 
0.008 
(0.50) 
-0.057 
(-1.62) 
Dummy variable for 
lock-up length shorter 
than predicted 
0.013 
(1.16) 
0.010 
(0.92) 
0.011 
(0.58) 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.036 0.156 
N 174 174 174 
Table 9: Regression results for cumulative abnormal return around lock-up expiration (Dependent 
variable: Abnormal return around lock-up expiration). The regressions have White heteroskedasticity 
consistent coefficients and standard errors. T-statistics in parentheses. 
* Significant at a 10% level using a two-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a two-sided test 
*** Significant at a 1% level using a two-sided test 
 
In general, the results provide little in support of the commitment hypothesis. The 
variables relevant for testing of the commitment hypothesis are the ones related to 
information asymmetry. These include the underwriter rank, the book-to-market 
ratio, the market value of equity, the stock price volatility, whether there were 
offered any secondary shares in the IPO, and whether the firm performed an SEO 
within the lock-up period. The prediction is that variables indicating a higher 
information asymmetry will be negatively related to abnormal returns.  Our results 
show that the book-to-market variable supports the commitment hypothesis for 
the three- and five-day event window, the volatility variable supports the 
commitment hypothesis for the three- and six-day event window, but none of 
these results are significant. Further, the rest of the information asymmetry 
variables points in the opposite direction. Most importantly, the market value of 
equity variable goes in the opposite direction for all of our samples, and is also 
statistically significant. Note that although this is inconsistent with the 
commitment hypothesis, Brav and Gompers (2003) experienced the same results 
with this variable. The results are also consistent with our discussion of size in the 
section of Event-day Abnormal Return and Volume. The dummy variable of lock-
up length is positive for all the event-windows. This means that a lock-up length 
shorter than predicted by our lock-up length regression yields a positive abnormal 
return, although statistically insignificant. This is also opposite to the argument of 
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information asymmetry. In any case, we conclude that our regression results 
provide little support in favor of the commitment hypothesis. 
 
With respect to testing of downward sloping demand curves for stocks the 
regression provides ambiguous results. The first variable abnormal volume is 
expected to be negatively related to abnormal returns but this is not the case for 
any of our event-windows3. The relationship is positive, and is significant for the 
six-day event window. This is however consistent with Ofek and Richardson's 
(2000) argument about liquidity effects; if there is increased liquidity in a stock, 
the stock price should rise. The second variable, the fraction of post-IPO shares 
locked up is expected to have a negative relationship with abnormal returns, but 
this is only the case for the five-day event window, however not statistically 
significant. The third variable, VC-backing is expected to have a negative 
relationship with abnormal returns and this is the case for the three- and six-day 
event window, although not significant. These results are in general inconclusive 
with respect to whether demand curves for stocks slope downward. The negative 
coefficient of stock price volatility in the three- and six-day event window is, 
according to Brav and Gompers (2003), potentially consistent with costly 
arbitrage since higher volatility will limit the ability of arbitrageurs to profit from 
short selling before the lock-up expiration.  
 
All in all, we believe that the reason for our ambiguous results is mainly because 
of high degree of stock market efficiency. We find little evidence to make 
predictions about abnormal returns around lock-up expiration. We do however 
acknowledge the fact that the findings regarding lock-ups in the US had much 
higher sample sizes. The sample of Norwegian IPOs may be too small to bring 
meaningful results from the returns data at lock-up expiration. 
 
                                                 
3 In unreported results, we test the robustness of this result. In accordance with Ofek and 
Richardson (2000) we test the correlation between abnormal return and excess volume in the 6-day 
event window [0 to +5], where there was a significant cumulative abnormal return of -1.49% (p-
value 0.0335). The results displayed a positive but insignificant correlation of 0.12 (t-stat. 1.55). 
Qualitatively the results remain the same. 
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6.3 Determinants of Lock-up Length 
Next, we explore the determinants of lock-up length by testing the commitment 
hypothesis, additional compensation hypothesis and the signaling hypothesis. 
6.3.1 Commitment and Additional Underwriter Compensation 
Hypothesis 
We will now explore the determinants of lock-up length in order to test the second 
prediction of the commitment hypothesis, claiming that a higher degree of 
information asymmetry leads to longer lock-up periods. We will also briefly test 
the prediction of the additional underwriter compensation hypothesis, that lock-
ups are longer for firms going public with high quality underwriters. This 
regression corresponds to the regression of lock-up length by Brav and Gompers 
(2003). The results are presented in table 10: 
 Log (Number of lock-up days) 
Intercept 5.590*** 
(29.46) 
5.703*** 
(24.07) 
Dummy variable for 
venture backing 
-0.239** 
(-2.49) 
-0.185* 
(-2.16) 
Log (Market value of 
equity) 
-0.034 
(-1.38) 
-0.03 
(-1.07) 
Fraction of post-IPO 
shares locked up 
0.126 
(0.74) 
0.098 
(0.59) 
Log (Book-to-market 
ratio) 
-0.089 
(-1.68) 
-0.069 
(-1.62) 
Underwriter rank -0.114 
(-0.22) 
0.034 
(0.07) 
Dummy variable for 
before/after 2001  
-0.193* 
(-1.99) 
Adjusted R2 0.024 0.048 
N 174 174 
Table 10: Regression results for lock-up length (Dependent variable: Log (Number of lock-up days)). 
The regressions have White heteroskedasticity consistent coefficients and standard errors. T-statistics 
in parentheses. 
* Significant at a 10% level using a two-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a two-sided test 
*** Significant at a 1% level using a two-sided test 
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The results of the first regression provide some support for the second prediction 
of the commitment hypothesis, as all the variables associated with lower 
information asymmetry have a negative relationship with lock-up length, but only 
the VC-variable is statistically significant. In the second regression we have 
accounted for the time effect, and we see that the effect is significant. 
Qualitatively, the results remain the same, except that the relationship between 
underwriter rank and lock-up days turns positive, but still not significant.  
 
The results, however, provide little in support of the additional underwriter 
compensation hypothesis. After accounting for time effects and information 
asymmetry the underwriter rank is positive but far from significant. Overall, the 
results are consistent with to the findings of Brav and Gompers (2003). 
6.3.2 Signaling Hypothesis 
Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that investors are unable to separate firms based 
on signal prior to the submission of the IPO prospectuses. However, since the 
lock-up length and the percentage of shares locked-up are specified in the IPO 
prospectuses before the IPO, investors should be able to observe the signal 
subsequent to the submission of the IPO prospectuses, and high-quality firms 
should therefore be able to revise the IPO offering price, in order to extract a 
higher price.  
 
We test the signaling hypothesis by creating two subsamples. The first subsample 
is consisting of firms with a positive price revision, defined by the difference 
between the actual offering price and the midpoint of the initial offering range, 
indicating a high-quality firm. The second subsample is the firms with a negative 
price revision, indicating low-quality firms. In addition, we excluded firms where 
the midrange offering price was equal to the actual offering price.  
 
According to the first prediction we made from the signaling hypothesis, we 
expect that high-quality firms lock-up their shares for a longer period than low-
quality firms. Contrary to the prediction, we find by examining the results, 
presented in table 11, that the opposite is the case. In fact, while not statistically 
significant, firms with a positive price revision lock-up their shares for a shorter 
period than firms with a negative price-revision. Thus, we find no support for the 
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evidence of the signaling hypothesis. The lack of support for the signaling 
hypothesis is similar to the findings of Brav and Gompers (2003). It can further be 
argued that the percentage of shares locked-up is a signal of quality in itself. 
However, as the percentage locked-up is practically identical for both subsamples, 
we conclude that the percentage locked is unrelated to the price revision, and 
therefore confirming the lack of support for the signaling hypothesis.  
 
Price revision N Days Locked Percentage Locked (%) 
Positive  25 238 41.08 
Negative 38 262 41.63 
p-value  0.2399 0.4659 
Table 11: Signaling Hypothesis – Price revision from midpoint initial offer range to final offer price. 
* Significant at a 10% level using a one-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a one-sided test 
 
The second part of the signaling hypothesis predicts that firms with longer lock-up 
length should have a higher probability of having a subsequent SEO. In order to 
test the second prediction, we made two subsamples of firms above and below the 
median lock-up length. In addition, we excluded the firms where the lock-up 
length was equal to the median. Contrary to the prediction, we see by examining 
the results, presented in table 12, that firms with a lock-up length shorter than the 
median had a higher probability of having a subsequent SEO. These results are 
similar to what Brav and Gompers (2003) discovered. Therefore, while the results 
are not statistically significant, they provide no empirical support for the signaling 
hypothesis. Further, Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that firms with a short lock-
up length should lock-up a higher fraction of their shares. However, examining 
the results we see that the opposite is true. In fact, firms with a lock-up length 
above median lock-up a significantly higher percentage than firms with lock-up 
length below median.  
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 N Days Locked Percentage 
Locked (%) 
Probability of 
SEOs (%) 
Length > Median 81 385 35.35 64.20 
Length < Median 26 124 27.71 69.23 
p-value  0.0000*** 0.0884* 0.3212 
Table 12: Signaling Hypothesis 
* Significant at a 10% level using a one-sided test 
** Significant at a 5% level using a one-sided test 
*** Significant at a 1% level using a one-sided test 
 
Having found no support for the signaling hypothesis, we therefore conclude that 
it seems unlikely that the length of the lock-up agreements is used by insiders to 
signal firm quality. This conclusion is consistent with the findings of Brav and 
Gompers (2003). 
7 Conclusion 
In our research, we find that the Oslo Stock Exchange seems to be efficient, as 
there appears to be no significant price reaction around the lock-up expiry, and 
therefore we find some support for the efficient market hypothesis. Consequently, 
there are no arbitrage opportunities. There are several possible explanations as to 
why we did not find a negative abnormal return. The first, and probably the most 
prominent explanation is that there may have been early release of shares by the 
underwriter with we are unable to observe. Second, the numbers of observations 
with lock-ups in the Norwegian market is relatively low. Lastly, Norwegian firms 
lock-up a relatively smaller fraction of their shares than what researchers have 
shown from empirical studies in other countries. In addition, we found a 
permanent increase in trading volume of approximately 85 percent, thus we find 
no support for the theory of downward sloping demand curves.  
 
Further, we have found some support for the commitment hypothesis. More 
specifically, we found that lock-up length is shorter and the fraction of shares 
locked-up is higher for firms where information asymmetry and adverse selection 
problem to be less severe. In addition, we have found that the percentage locked-
up is negatively related to the lock-up length. Thus, a firm can either commit by 
locking-up more shares or be accepting a longer lock-up period.  On the other 
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hand, we found no support for the signaling and additional underwriter 
compensation hypothesis.  
 
Lastly, we found that the typical Norwegian lock-up agreement consists of 
approximately 40 percent of the outstanding shares and lasts for 180 days.  
 
While we have not explored these areas, we have a few suggestions for further 
studies of lock-up agreements in the Norwegian market. First, it might be useful 
to explore whether there exist any cross-sectional differences between firms with 
and firms without lock-ups, in order to shed further light on the explanation for 
the existence of lock-ups. Second, examine if, and to what extent, there has been 
early release from lock-up agreements. Third, the model we used for the signaling 
hypothesis was relatively simple. A potential extension can be to construct a more 
formal model, such as Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005). Fourth, explore if 
there are any differences with respect to the forecasts of affiliated and unaffiliated 
analysts in Norway, such as Brav and Gompers (2000). Lastly, if newer and more 
extensive research on Norwegian lock-up agreements is able to documents a 
significant price decline, it may be useful to study potential price pressure and 
microstructure effects as a explanation for the price reaction.  
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9 Appendices 
9.1 Underwriter Rank 
Manager 1993-2000 2001-2004 2005-2008 
Pareto 0,0083 0,0207 0,1582 
Sundal Collier 0,0039 0,0638 0,1353 
Carnegie 0,0152 0,0069 0,1340 
DnB 0,2866 0,4849 0,1326 
Enskilda 0,0017 0,2224 0,0945 
UBS 0,0000 0,0000 0,0757 
Credit Suisse 0,0387 0,0000 0,0714 
Glitnir 0,0000 0,0000 0,0305 
Fondsfinans 0,0023 0,0010 0,0218 
Morgan Stanley 0,0715 0,0000 0,0205 
Nordea 0,0000 0,0098 0,0160 
Kaupthing 0,0000 0,0000 0,0102 
CAR 0,0000 0,0000 0,0095 
First 0,0000 0,0187 0,0095 
Terra 0,0000 0,0007 0,0093 
Goldman Sachs 0,2803 0,0000 0,0063 
Lehman 0,0000 0,0000 0,0063 
Alfred Berg 0,0481 0,0000 0,0020 
Handelsbanken 0,0000 0,0017 0,0013 
Nordnett 0,0000 0,0000 0,0011 
SPB Midt-Norge 0,0000 0,0000 0,0007 
Fearnley 0,0447 0,0000 0,0005 
Netfonds 0,0000 0,0010 0,0000 
Christiania 0,0039 0,0000 0,0000 
Orkla 0,0070 0,0000 0,0000 
Karl Johan 0,0096 0,0000 0,0000 
Deutsche Bank 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Norse 0,0093 0,0000 0,0000 
Orion 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 
Elcon 0,0016 0,0000 0,0000 
Kristiania Fonds 0,0387 0,0000 0,0000 
Noka Securities 0,0074 0,0000 0,0000 
Danske 
Securities 
0,0150 0,0000 0,0000 
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9.2 Correlation Matrix 
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9.3 List of All Firms 
List of all companies using lock-up agreements in our sample period, market 
value of equity is adjusted for 2000 level. 
 
Company IPO MV of Equity 
24SevenOffice 2007 159 279 203 
Ability Drilling 2007 712 632 040 
Ability Group ASA 2006 2 629 523 832 
ACL  Atlantic Container Line AB 1994 746 191 513 
Acta Holding ASA 2001 683 409 890 
Active 24 2004 202 093 491 
Aker Floating Production 2006 1 557 850 467 
Aker Kvaerner 2004 6 481 958 922 
Aker Seafoods 2005 1 288 612 254 
Akva Group 2006 539 884 822 
Algeta 2007 644 361 265 
Allianse ASA 2005 263 278 063 
Aqua Bio Technology 2008 143 476 572 
ARROW Seismic ASA 2007 1 466 414 418 
AS Eltek 1998 520 838 220 
Austevoll Seafood 2006 6 358 069 274 
Axxessit ASA 2004 462 939 214 
Badger Explorer ASA 2007 556 039 262 
Bergen Group 2008 1 054 293 810 
Bergesen Worldwide Offshore Ltd. 2006 4 448 202 769 
Biotec Pharmacon ASA 2005 492 417 354 
Bjørge 2004 285 629 378 
Block Watne Gruppen 2006 1 484 350 042 
Bluewater Insurance ASA 2005 262 666 252 
Bouvet 2007 394 957 841 
Camillo Eitzen & Co 2004 997 346 531 
Catch Communications ASA 2004 587 030 680 
Cecon ASA 2007 942 908 474 
Cermaq ASA 2005 3 739 017 159 
Choice Hotels Scandinavia 1997 1 118 006 989 
Clavis Pharma 2006 567 051 556 
Codfarmers 2006 344 869 371 
Computer Advances Group ASA 1996 280 802 819 
Consafe Offshore 2005 2 674 191 268 
Conseptor 2004 295 420 485 
Consorte 2001 238 618 289 
ContextVision 1997 359 217 791 
Copeinca ASA 2007 1 613 189 292 
CRI-Gruppen 1998 114 313 950 
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Customax 2000 643 610 323 
Deep Ocean 2005 1 070 407 950 
Deep Sea Supply 2005 501 296 495 
Dockwise 2007 4 700 423 516 
Dolphin Interconnect Solutions ASA 2006 163 697 777 
DynaPel Systems 2005 44 732 312 
EDB - Elektronisk Databehandling ASA 1997 316 048 389 
Eidesvik Offshore 2005 1 381 765 856 
Eitzen Chemical 2006 4 342 799 490 
ElectroMagnetic GeoServices ASA 2007 9 506 282 985 
Enitel ASA 1999 1 888 603 073 
Etman International 2007 75 855 923 
Exense ASA 2000 138 000 000 
Expert Eilag ASA 2000 1 992 982 560 
Factor Eiendom 2006 1 948 066 015 
Findexa 2004 4 707 041 262 
Fjord Seafoods 2000 3 685 072 765 
Fred Olsen Production 2007 2 336 890 826 
Fred.  Olsen Energy 1997 11 762 494 888 
Funcom 2005 518 780 897 
Future Information Research Management 2005 276 025 816 
Geo ASA 2005 2 129 363 054 
Global Geo Services 2000 495 000 000 
Global IP Solutions 2008 193 237 262 
Grenland Group 2005 553 814 046 
Grieg Seafood ASA 2007 1 599 429 815 
HafslundInfratek 2007 669 893 866 
Havila Shipping ASA 2005 545 291 095 
Ige Nordic AB 2007 286 249 254 
Infostream_ASA 1999 258 583 785 
Int_Gold_Exploration 1997 48 844 990 
Intellinet 2000 331 551 330 
Interoil_Web_Prospekt 2006 590 329 418 
Iplast 1997 603 181 504 
Jøtul 1994 146 988 248 
Kongsberg Automotive 2005 1 928 428 703 
Kredittkassen 1993 7 186 120 223 
Lerøy Seafood Group 2002 902 750 372 
London Mining 2007 1 573 090 396 
Luxo 1998 400 160 878 
Mamut ASA 2004 263 012 897 
Marine Farms 2006 4 121 397 656 
Media & Research Group 2005 124 730 148 
Medi-Stim 2004 185 910 182 
Navamedic ASA 2006 100 117 587 
NEAS ASA 2007 222 741 990 
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NetCom 1996 4 860 296 645 
NextGenTel Holding 2003 524 404 211 
NorCool Holding 1997 352 906 130 
Noreco (Norwegian Energy Company) 2007 3 468 173 731 
Norema 1998 418 702 249 
Norkom 2000 235 200 000 
Nortrans Offshore Limited, USD 1998 474 750 000 
Norway Seafoods ASA 1997 3 854 518 295 
Nutri Pharma 2000 4 136 471 337 
Oceanteam Power & Umbilical ASA 2007 800 438 997 
Odim 2005 316 257 332 
Odim Hitec 2001 570 138 341 
Opera Software ASA 2004 1 031 264 828 
Opticom 1997 1 437 572 773 
Otrum Electronics 1998 807 075 000 
PA Resources AB 2001 84 726 109 
Pan Fish 1997 705 986 227 
PC Lan 1999 521 458 734 
Pertra ASA 2006 1 532 696 291 
Petrojack ASA 2005 400 857 287 
Petrojarl 2006 2 756 265 563 
PetroMENA ASA 2007 1 900 121 823 
PhotoCure 2000 2 591 600 000 
Polimoon 2005 750 164 579 
Powel 2005 263 607 928 
Protector Insurance ASA 2007 1 379 204 151 
Q-Free 2002 716 332 155 
Questerre Energy 2005 97 641 036 
REM Offshore ASA 2007 1 515 806 832 
Remedial Offshore PCL 2008 779 657 855 
Renewable Energy Corporation ASA 2006 51 816 389 573 
Revus Energy 2005 1 330 880 033 
RGI 1996 5 251 854 590 
Romreal 2007 1 051 385 780 
ScanArc 2007 1 151 462 226 
SeaBird Exploration LLT 2006 1 680 352 281 
Seamteam Tech ASA 1997 923 394 683 
Selmer AS 1995 733 484 214 
Sense Communications International 2000 1 210 908 000 
Sevan Marine 2004 603 823 151 
Spits 2006 100 356 078 
Statoil ASA 2001 146 633 747 702 
Stavdal Maskinutleie 1998 581 684 262 
Stepstone 2000 11 022 508 950 
Synnøve Finden Meierier 1998 267 054 260 
System etikettering AS 1993 226 098 377 
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TeleComputing ASA 2000 1 616 942 513 
Telenor 2000 72 086 075 960 
Telio Holding 2006 490 817 014 
Thraneguppen ASA 1997 286 427 215 
Trefoil 2005 1 323 570 644 
Trolltech 2006 801 621 170 
Ulstein Holding 1997 2 378 630 184 
Wavefield Inseis ASA 2007 5 438 629 522 
Wega Mining 2007 1 384 567 411 
Wilson ASA 2005 777 768 365 
Yara International 2004 15 169 987 467 
 
  
GRA1900 –Thesis                                                                                    01.09.2011 
                               Page 57 
9.4 Preliminary Thesis Report 
Andreas Spjelkevik Evensen  
Øivind Christian Thuen 
 
 
 
 
 
BI Norwegian School of Management 
 
Preliminary Thesis Report 
 
Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs), lock-ups and 
market efficiency 
Andreas Spjelkevik Evensen and Øivind Christian Thuen 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Øyvind Norli 
 
 
Hand-in date: 
17.01.2011 
 
Campus: 
BI Oslo 
 
Examination code and name: 
GRA1900 Master Thesis 
 
Program: 
Master of Science in Business and Economics 
 
GRA1900 –Thesis                                                                                    01.09.2011 
                               Page 58 
Table of Contents 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS.......................................................................................................... 5858 
INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 5959 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND ......................................................................................... 6161 
DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................................... 6161 
LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................................................................................. 6161 
HYPOTHESES ......................................................................................................................... 6565 
HYPOTHESIS 1 ......................................................................................................................... 6565 
HYPOTHESIS 2 ......................................................................................................................... 6565 
POSSIBLE EXTENSIONS ............................................................................................................ 6565 
METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................... 6666 
DATA ......................................................................................................................................... 6767 
EVALUATION AND PROGRESSION .................................................................................. 6969 
REFERENCE LIST .................................................................................................................. 7070 
 
  
GRA1900 –Thesis                                                                                    01.09.2011 
                               Page 59 
Introduction 
According to Ofek and Richardson (2000), only around 15-20 percent of the total 
shares outstanding are offered to the public through Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs), thus the majority of the shares are held by insiders and other pre-IPO 
shareholders.  
 
Typically, insiders possess more information about the firm than outside 
investors. Due to the information asymmetry between traders, and the fact that the 
value of a firm going public is always connected with a degree of uncertainty, 
there is a risk that a single large shareholder trying to sell his shares in the first 
week of trading could be interpreted by the market as a sign of stock overpricing, 
and thus send the stock price downward, to the detriment of all shareholders. 
 
To prevent the market from getting flooded with too much supply of a company’s 
shares too rapidly, insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders are often, for a 
prespecified time, prohibited from selling their shares. This contractual agreement 
between underwriters and existing shareholders (such as founders, executives, 
employees and venture capitalists) is a phenomenon referred to as lock-up or lock-
up agreement. The length of lock-ups varies from 90 days to 2 years, though the 
most common length is 180 days. In addition to temporarily constraining the 
supply of stocks, lock-ups can, potentially, serve as a commitment device and a 
signal of firm quality.  
 
The terms and lengths of the lock-ups are included in the IPO prospectuses, 
making the expiration date of lock-ups publicly available information, therefore 
making lock-ups a completely observable event. Thus, assuming market 
efficiency, it should be expected that the effect and information regarding lock-
ups should be fully reflected in the stock price. However, Ofek and Richardson 
(2000) found in their study of the American Stock Market a stock price decrease 
of 1-3 percent, while average trading volume increased with 40 percent at the time 
of lock-up expiration.  
 
Similar studies have been conducted by Field and Hanka (2001), where they 
found a statistically three-day abnormal return of -1.5 percent, and a permanent 
increase in average trading volume of 40 percent when lock-ups expire. 
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While research papers such as Ofek and Richardson (2000), Field and Hanka 
(2001) and Brav and Gompers (2003) have provided some evidence from the US 
market, there has, to our knowledge, been committed little to none effort into 
research of the effect of lock-ups at the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
 
Therefore, throughout this paper we want to examine whether there exists a 
significant relationship between stock price and lock-up expiration in the 
Norwegian Market, and whether it is possible to predict and/or exploit the 
abnormal return at lock-up expiration. In addition, among possible extensions to 
our research can be to develop and test different hypotheses to find explanations 
as to why this is the case.  
 
In order to proceed with our analysis of the effect lock-ups have on IPOs in the 
Norwegian Market, we will collect and analyze data from Oslo Stock Exchange 
for the period 1997 to 2009, as well as going through the prospectuses from the 
IPOs to learn about the lock-up terms and conditions.  
 
In our thesis we will first present key findings from existing literature and 
previous studies. We will then use the key findings as motivation and tools to 
develop hypotheses. Then we will proceed to describe the intended process for 
data and sample selection. Lastly, we will provide a brief evaluation of our 
progress and a plan for further research.   
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Theoretical background 
In this section we will start by briefly defining key concepts for our research. We 
will then present and review the most significant literature available on lock-up 
effects of IPOs and the empirical findings. 
Definitions 
Initial Public Offering 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) refers to the first sale of a private company’s 
shares to the public, and is often associated with the private firm being listed, and 
thereafter, publicly traded on a stock exchange, such as the Oslo Stock Exchange 
(OSE). Among benefits of going public is easier and cheaper access to capital, as 
well as making the company’s shares more liquid, thus enabling founders and 
other long-time insiders to cash-out for their work.  
Lock-up 
A lock-up, often called lock-up period, lock-up agreement, or lock-in, refers to a 
prespecified time period following an IPO where insiders and other pre-IPO 
shareholders are not allowed to sell their shares. The length of the lock-up period 
is typically 180 days, though it varies from 90 days and up to 2 years.  
Abnormal Return 
In our paper, abnormal return refers to the difference between a single stock and 
an index’s (e.g. OBX) performance at given time t.  
Excess Trading Volume 
Abnormal daily trading volume, or excess volume, refers to the difference 
between a single firm’s daily mean trading volume in the lock-up period, and the 
daily average trading volume at lock-up expiration. 
 
Having defined the key concepts, we will proceed with presenting and reviewing 
existing literature. 
 
Literature review 
In the efficient market hypothesis, Fama (1970) suggests that stock prices fully 
reflect all available information on a particular stock and/or market. Thus, 
investors cannot take advantage in predicting stock returns because no one has 
access to information not already available to everyone else. In this context, the 
study of lock-ups is particularly interesting because lock-up expiration is a 
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completely observable event and should, according to Fama, already be fully 
reflected in the stock price.  
 
Scholes (1972) represents one of the early works, suggesting that demand curves 
for stocks are downward sloping, thus challenging theories based on the no 
arbitrage condition. More specifically, if demand curves for stocks are downward 
sloping, this implies that firms issuing shares are not only price takers, but they 
are also able to influence share price by regulating the amount of shares 
outstanding. This would challenge the dividend policy and capital structure 
irrelevance theorems of corporate finance, developed first and foremost by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958 and 1961). 
 
Levin and Wright (2006) argues that downward sloping demand curves for stocks 
are inconsistent with the traditional view of market efficiency, that stock prices 
are determined only by expectations of future cash flows and the discount rate. 
Further, by estimating the slope of the demand curve using an econometric model 
and market maker's transaction data for specific stocks, they are able to provide 
empirical support for downward sloping demand curves for stocks. However, 
other studies, such as Mikkelson and Partch (1985), Holthausen, Leftwich and 
Mayers (1990) and Keim and Madhavan (1996), are only able to provide 
ambiguous empirical evidence for the existence of downward sloping demand 
curves for stocks. 
 
As the length of the lock-up period is clearly stated in the IPO prospectus, making 
the event completely observable, investors should, according to market efficiency, 
on average correctly predict the stock price at expiry. The study of lock-up 
expiration could therefore potentially provide useful information regarding the 
hypotheses of downward sloping demand curves, market efficiency and the 
capital structure irrelevance theorem. A significant change in stock price at lock-
up expiration would imply anomalous evidences against the efficient market 
hypothesis. Further, since additional stocks are released for trading in the market 
at lock-up expiry, a significant price drop would provide support for the theory of 
downward sloping demand curves for stocks and evidence against the capital 
structure irrelevance theorem. 
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In their paper, Ofek and Richardson (2000) investigate excess trading volume and 
price patterns at the expiration of lock-up periods, and test whether they find any 
evidence for market efficiency and/or downward sloping demand curves. They 
emphasize that, as the length of lock-ups is publicly available, the information 
should already be fully reflected in the stock prices prior to lock-up expiry. 
Through their research, they are able to document a stock price decline of 1-3 
percent, while trading volume increases with about 40 percent. They conclude that 
the decline in stock prices provides new anomalous evidence against market 
efficiency. They explore several possible explanations, such as bid-ask bounce, 
liquidity effects and biased expectations of supply shocks. However, they find 
little support for these explanations. In addition, they also attempt to empirically 
explain the cross-sectional differences in abnormal return between different firms. 
They find that certain variables, such as stock price volatility, are clearly 
associated with larger stock price drops at lock-up expiration. Even though they 
are able to find a significant drop in stock prices at expiry, they conclude that 
there are no arbitrage opportunities.  
 
In their paper, Field and Hanka (2001) reports a permanent 40 percent increase in 
average trading volume and a statistically prominent three-day abnormal return of 
-1.5 percent.  They find that the abnormal return and excess volume are larger 
when the firm is financed by venture capitalists. They also find that venture 
capitalists sell more aggressively than insiders and other pre-IPO shareholders. In 
addition, they find limited support for several their hypotheses, but no complete 
explanations.  
 
The findings of Field and Hanka are supported by Bradley et al. (2001), which 
find that firms backed by venture capital are associated with significant negative 
abnormal returns at lock-up expirations. Further, they document that within the 
group of venture capital backed firms the largest losses occur for "high-tech" 
firms, firms with highest stock price increases since the IPO, the largest relative 
trading volume around lock-up expiration, and firms using the highest quality 
underwriters.   
 
However, we find that not all studies of lock-up expiry coincide with the results 
from the studies conducted in the US. Espenlaub et al. (2001) find no statistically 
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significant abnormal return at the expiry of lock-up agreements in the UK market. 
Similar conclusions are made by Goergen, Renneboog and Khursted (2006) 
regarding the French and the German markets.  
 
Brav and Gompers (2000) represent one of the pioneer explorers in the use of 
lock-up agreements. They explore the motivation for the lock-ups by examining 
the structure and how it affects underpricing at the time of the IPO. Further, they 
explore the price reaction and trading activity at the time of the lock-up 
expiration. In addition, they explore the recommendations of affiliated and 
unaffiliated analysts around the time of expiration.  Their paper finds support for 
the theory that lock-ups serve as commitment mechanisms at the time of the IPO, 
and that IPO underpricing is higher for firms with longer lock-up period and firms 
that lock up a larger fraction of their shares.  They find an average abnormal 
return of -1.2% at the time of lock-up expiry, and that the abnormal return is 
greater for firms that lock up a greater fraction of their shares, and for firms that 
are backed by venture capitalists. They imply that the stock price drop challenges 
the framework of rational expectations, and that it is potentially consistent with 
downward sloping demand curves for stocks and/or investors' incorrect prior 
beliefs.  
 
Brav and Gompers (2003) extend their previous work, and develop three different 
hypotheses regarding reasons for the existence of lock-up agreements. They 
explore whether lock-ups serve the purpose of being a signaling mechanism for 
firm quality, a commitment device to alleviate problems of moral hazard or a 
mechanism for underwriters to extract additional compensation from the issuing 
firms. While they find support for the commitment hypothesis, they find little 
support for the signaling hypothesis. The rejection of the signaling hypothesis is 
considerably challenged by Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005). They argue that 
the dismissal of the signaling theory is at best premature. By developing the 
hypothesis into a formal model, they are able to provide support for the signaling 
hypothesis, and conclude that the signaling theory continues to possess both 
theoretical and empirical merit. 
 
Having reviewed most of the interesting existing literature, we continue with 
developing hypotheses.  
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Hypotheses 
During our paper we will discuss and explore a few hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis is based on the traditional view of efficiency in the stock 
market. Investors form rational expectations, and since all information about the 
terms and length of the lock-up is fully available, it should be embedded in the 
stock price at the first day of IPO trading and prior to lock-up expiry. Thus 
investors will not systematically fail in their pricing of the stock, and there should 
be no significant price reaction at lock-up expiration. Moreover, as a consequence 
of Modigliani and Miller (1958), firms issuing shares are price takers and the 
supply of shares has no impact on the stock price. This leads us to the hypothesis 
of no statistically significant price reaction at the time around lock-up expiration. 
We can therefore formulate the first hypothesis as follows: 
 
There will, on average, be zero abnormal return in the time around the lock-up 
expiration. 
Hypothesis 2 
The competing hypothesis is inspired by the research and empirical findings of 
Ofek and Richardson (2000), Field and Hanka (2001) and Brav and Gompers 
(2000), which document a statistically significant negative abnormal returns on 
the time around lock-up expiration. The theory of downward sloping demand 
curves for stocks suggests and supports a negative abnormal return. At the event 
of lock-up expiration a significant number of shares are suddenly released to the 
market, causing a positive shift in the supply curve of stocks. With downward 
sloping demand curves this implies a drop in the stock price. From this we form a 
competing second hypothesis: 
 
There will, on average, be negative abnormal returns in the time around the lock-
up expiration. 
 
Possible extensions 
As the existing empirical results are ambiguous with respect to different countries, 
we are uncertain which hypothesis we will find most empirical support for. We 
are aware there may be a need to extend our research and provide additional 
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hypotheses. Among additional hypotheses, we have hypotheses intended to 
explain differences in firm characteristics leading to differences in abnormal 
returns (e.g. firms with venture capital backing suffer higher negative abnormal 
return, etc). Note also that downward sloping demand curves imply negative 
abnormal returns, but one cannot conclude the other way around. The reason for 
this is that there are other possible explanations for abnormal returns, including 
bid-ask bounce, liquidity effects and biased expectations of supply shocks. We 
can also extend our research to assess whether it is possible to exploit arbitrage 
opportunities.  
 
Having formulated our hypotheses, we will now present the methodology. 
 
Methodology  
The central issue of our thesis is to test whether there is abnormal return around 
the time of lock-up expiration. We will do this by collecting returns from the days 
around the lock-up expiration of each individual firm. Each return will then be 
subtracted by the index return for the same day, and this will represent abnormal 
return at expiration for each firm. Our definition of abnormal return is 
corresponding with the one of Ofek and Richardson (2000): 
 
             
 
where ARit is the abnormal return of stock i on day t, Rit is the return of stock i on 
day t, and RIt is the return on the index I on day t. There are two ways of analyzing 
the lock-up expiration. We can calculate abnormal return for the lock-up day only, 
or we can calculate abnormal return for days prior and days following the 
expiration. At this point, we aim to explore both alternatives, in order to see how 
well the market accounts for the event of lock-up expiration. Finally, the data 
series of abnormal returns will be regressed upon a mean. If the mean proves to be 
significantly negative, hypothesis 2 is supported from our data set, otherwise 
hypothesis 1 is supported. We intend to apply standard OLS-procedure, but we 
will need to assess whether the assumptions behind the OLS-procedure is 
sufficiently satisfied in order to make a final assessment.  
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After obtaining the test results, our main focus will be to find explanations for the 
cross-sectional differences in abnormal return, in order to develop possible 
predictions. This will be done through a regression with abnormal returns at 
expiration as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables will be several 
firm characteristics and demand differences which have received empirical 
support from existing literature, such as Ofek and Richardson (2000) and Brav 
and Gompers (2000). Among possible relevant variables are the number of lock-
up days, a dummy variable for venture capital backing, total return from offering 
price, standard deviation of stock return, daily trading volume, stock price  at day 
-5, the equity value, the percentage of shares locked, standard deviation of analyst 
earnings forecast, book to market ratio and underwriter ranking.  
 
Depending on the results, we have a few possible extensions to our research. If we 
are able to find evidence for a drop in stock price at expiry, we want to test 
whether the abnormal return is arbitrageable. An assessment of this may focus on 
the bid-ask spread, shorting possibilities and/or how many of the individual lock-
up expiration events which actually experience negative returns. 
 
Another potential extension to our research is to sort the sample into different 
groups, such as long and short lock-up periods, and assess whether there are any 
differences among the groups.  
 
Having briefly presented the methodology we are going to use, we will explain 
how we intend to gather our data and sample selection. 
 
Data 
We intend to gather our sample from IPOs on the Oslo Stock Exchange for the 
period 1997 to 2009. We will further collect data from IPO prospectuses from the 
Department of Finance at BI Norwegian School of Management, in addition to a 
database on IPOs provided by BI Norwegian School of Management. We intend 
to collect the following information: Date of IPO, issue price, lock-up length and 
the date of lock-up expiration.  
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We will also collect additional data from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), like 
daily return on stock indices, individual stock price development and trading 
volume. We intend to gather these data by e.g. Thomson Reuters Datastream.  
 
Further, we intend to exclude firms with no lock-up period and firms with long 
lock-up periods (more than 365 days) from the sample selection. In addition, to 
avoid price discreteness, we will consider excluding firms with very low stock 
prices. The sample selection exclusion process is in correspondence with the one 
proposed by Ofek and Richardson (2000). 
 
If a statistically significant price drop at lock-up expiry is evident, a possible 
extension is to explore the cross-sectional differences between firms. This will 
require additional data, such as the standard deviation of analysts forecast, which 
underwriter is used, whether the firm is venture backed or not, the stock price 
volatility over the lock-up period, and firm descriptive information like stock 
price level and size of the firm. 
 
If we find no statistically significant drop in stock prices, we may extend our 
research to alternative areas of lock-up research, like Brav and Gompers' (2003) 
investigation of the reason for the existence of lock-ups, and the determinants of 
lock-up length. Again, this will require additional data, such as the number of 
shares locked up, the number of primary and secondary shares offered, book to 
market ratios, cash flow margins, and the percent of company's shares issued in 
the IPO.  
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Evaluation and Progression 
Overall, we are satisfied with our progression. We have reviewed a large amount 
of the literature which we have found relevant for our thesis topic. For now, we 
have not gathered, or attempted to gather any data. Thus, we are aware, and to 
some extent even expect, that it may be required that we further expand our 
literature review.  
 
We are also aware that previous studies on International Capital Markets may not 
be transferable to the Norwegian Market, thus we might have to revise and do 
changes to the methodology, data and sample selection if we find no statistical 
significant results supporting our hypotheses. Needless to say, we are excited and 
optimistic regarding further progression. 
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